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PLUCKY LITTLE RUSSIA:
MISREADING THE GEORGIAN WAR
THROUGH THE DISTORTING LENS OF
AGGRESSION
TIMOTHY WILLIAM WATERS*
One might expect massed armor crossing an internationalfrontier to
constitute the paradigmatic example of aggression-a case perfectly fit to
analyze with the rules ofjus ad bellum-and in the firstflush andshock of the
Georgian War in 2008, this is exactly how Western leaders described
Russia's actions. Yet that August, a constellation of circumstancescombined
to produce an anomalous outcome: an international war without any
aggressor or any wrongful violation of territorialintegrity. In theory-in
doctrine-thisis not supposed to happen.
The key to this puzzle is the special regime created by the 1992 Sochi
Agreement, which functioned as an internationalizedmechanism regulating
the internal conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia by creating a new
territorialstatus within Georgia's sovereignty. Once we view Sochi in this
way, the performance of the various actors in August 2008 looks rather
different: Rather than aggressors,Russian tanks are a responsive mechanism
designed to stop Georgian incursions in violation of the Sochi regime-a
mechanism, moreover, that actually worked as it was supposed to.
Understandingthe Georgian War in this way leads us to confront our present,
dualistic approaches to sovereignty: Under international law, it is by
definition impossible for Georgia to aggress against itself or violate its own
territorialintegrity, and it is only because of the Sochi regime that we can
describe Georgia'sactions as wrongful.
In some ways, the 2008 war looks like part of a risingphenomenon: the
effort to regulate the resort to violence within states. Indeed, the Sochi
Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington; Humboldt Ex-

perienced Research Fellow at the Max-Planck-Institutfur auslandischesoffentliches Recht und V6ker-
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Fawn, David Fidler, Hurst Hannum, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Robert Ivie, Ajay Mehrotra, Christiana
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regime suggests a far better mechanism than some of the currentproposals,
since it creates a new category ofprotectable territory,rather than identifying
levels of harm that triggera reaction; this may be particularlyuseful in selfdetermination disputes, in which separatists challenge the very fact of the
state's sovereignty. Still, seeing the Georgian War in this way is not
necessarily a source ofoptimism. Sochi was the product ofa specific context,
and there is no reason to suppose it is generalizable. But the greatest source
of pessimism concerns the rhetoricalreactions to the war: Western leaders
resorted to the vocabularies of the jus ad bellum in ways that distracted them
from the actual operation of the mechanism regulating the underlying
conflict. It seems we remain enchanted by categories, ill-equipped to
recognize the reallogic of our own imperfect efforts to regulate internalwars.
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INTRODUCTION: PUZZLING CRITICISM, AND A DOCTRINAL PUZZLEWAR WITHOUT A LEGAL WRONG?

The August 2008 Georgian War' elicited immediate, strong condemnation
of Russia by most Western states. While understandable from a geopolitical
perspective or as an expression of shared political values, the particular critiques
Western states employed were curiously suffused with the language of law.
Western states accused Russia of aggression, disproportionate use of force,
occupation of Georgian territory, and improperly recognizing the independence of
two secessionist regions-all defined modes of conduct in international
humanitarian law, international criminal law, or general international law. In fact,
the dominant rhetoric of Western officials centered on these categories rather than
calculating geopolitical interests or invoking human suffering.
These critiques had common themes: Western policymakers were much
more critical of Russia's decision to invade Georgia than of the way Russia fought
once it did. In legal terms, they made critiques arising out of the jus ad bellum
rather than the jus in bello.2 Second, they were very concerned with where Russia
fought. They objected much more to the war's territorial consequences-its threat
to the integrity of the Georgian state-than the human costs of the conflict, though
these were well known even as the war was going on.
From a certain perspective, this is not surprising: Shifts in control over
territory and challenges to the political order excite more concern than mere death.
Nor would one expect policymakers to be particularly fastidious in their legal
claims. Few are trained international lawyers, and in any event, the laws of war are
open to many interpretations-it is the rare actor who does not find the mote in his
enemy's eye sooner than the beam in his ally's. Political actors have been accusing
each other of violating the laws of war, with or without a basis in fact, since laws of
war were first articulated-presumably always with some combination of cynical
manipulation and genuine indignation.
So, in calling Russia's decision to fight illegal, Western policymakers may
have both sincerely thought themselves right and consciously been deploying law
as a tool of policy. What is of interest is the particular shape that otherwise typical
I Names for the conflict track problematically with political preferences. Cf 2008 South
Ossetia War, WIKIPEDIA (Dec. 2011), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_SouthOssetia-war (giving
names for the war-"the South Ossetia War" or "the Russia-Georgia War"-in regional languages, and
discussing objections to the neutrality of the article's title). "The August War" appropriates a lot of the
calendar, assuming optimistically that there won't be other wars in other Augusts. I use "the Georgian
War" as a plausible indicator of the war's location. Also, throughout I refer to "war," though the
standard usage in international law is "armed conflict." See Elihu Lauterpacht, The Legal Irrelevance
of the "State of War ", 62 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 58, 58 n. 1(1968).
2

See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 5,16 (4th ed. 2005);
see also

ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

223-24 (2007) (describing jus ad bellum as the legality of war and jus in bello as the basic rules of
warfare; describing the separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello as a fundamental principle of
international humanitarian law).
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exercise in opportunism and perspectival bias took: Policymakers-already
predisposed to support an ally-chose particular arguments that show us not merely
preferences, but blind spots. Whether sincere or strategic, the categories
policymakers deployed were seriously mismatched not only to the Georgian War,
but also to the nature of modem conflicts of the kind that war represents.
A candid evaluation of known events in the Georgian War, mapped against
the existing state of the law, suggests real difficulties with contemporary Western
critiques as acts of legal interpretation. As we will see, accusations that Russia
violated thejus ad bellum are largely unfounded. Yet it is immediately obvious that
Georgia did not violate the rules on aggression or territorial integrity either-given
that all its operations were within its own territory, it hardly could have. Indeed, it
might seem that no party committed aggression or illegally violated another state's
territorial integrity, yet there still was what we would call, in common parlance, a
war. In theory, this should not happen-unless the Security Council has acted, a
party's use of force should always violate some other sovereign's control of
territory-but this is exactly what seemed to happen in August 2008 in the
Caucasus.
The key to understanding this puzzle is the special regime that governed
South Ossetia, the separatist region of Georgia at the center of the 2008 war. The
justification for Russia's use of force is founded on its legitimate presence in the
disputed area, and in turn explains why there is a doctrinal basis for describing
Georgia's actions as violative-but doing so requires us to confront our present,
highly dualistic approaches to thejus ad bellum and to sovereignty over territory.
As we shall see, what specially characterized the situation in Georgia
before the war was the existence of an internationalizedinternal conflict and a

mechanism, already in place, to regulate the resort to force on part of Georgia's
territory. And what marked the subsequent reaction, once the war began, was a
patterned failure to understand and react to this legal and political reality. Instead,
Western actors resorted to the existing categories and vocabularies of the jus ad
bellum, in ways that distracted from the operation of the system for regulating the
underlying internal conflict between South Ossetia and Georgia, in which Russia
had become involved. Their responses to the Georgian War suggest that
policymakers-who are generally focused on political interests and values, rather
than formal categories-may nonetheless be curiously affected by the dysfunctional
doctrinal framework of contemporary humanitarian law, and discover themselves,
quite unwittingly, adopting positions that are difficult to understand or motivate.
This gap in the law arises from the rigidity of a jus ad bellum focused
entirely on interstate conflict. This narrow dogmatism increasingly appears as an
anomaly in a discipline that has become more realistically engaged with the nature
of combat: Over the past few decades, international criminal and humanitarian law
have followed a broad deformalizing trajectory, with doctrinal distinctions between
internal and international conflicts reduced or erased. Yet the norms regulating the
initial decision to use force have not followed this trend: The extension of
international humanitarian and criminal law to internal conflicts have played out
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within the jus in bello, while the law of aggression has halted at the frontier of the
state. This lacuna vitiates the value of the law in regulating the internal wars that
are now the most frequent form of armed conflict 3 -a failure to develop an
adequate language for describing resort to force.
But all of that is to anticipate this Article's conclusions; first, we must
work through the argument about what was said, what was actually happening, and
what the law was during the Georgian War. That argument runs like this: Part I
briefly lays out the contours of the peacekeeping, monitoring and conflict resolution
arrangements agreed for South Ossetia in the early 1990s, showing that functionally
they constituted an internationalized mechanism for regulating the internal conflict
between South Ossetia and Georgia. The next two parts then survey the general
legal norms governing use of force and their application in the Georgian War: Part
II analyzes the public statements of Western-particularly U.S.-policymakers
during the war, showing how they represented the conflict in relatively precise legal
terms; this part also begins to sketch out the basic outlines of the relevant legal
framework. Part III revisits these characterizations to demonstrate the mismatch
between plausible legal interpretations of the conflict and Western characterizations
of it. Briefly, it shows that Russia was not an aggressor-but neither was Georgia,
leaving us with an anomalous situation: a war without any unlawful cause. Part IV
shows that the straightest path to an adequate legal description requires us to
reconsider how we characterize Georgia's actions in light of the special legal
regime described in Part I-the Sochi Agreement. This special regime may point
the way to a reconceived relationship between the jus ad bellum and internal
conflicts in general international law; equally, though, the problematic features of
the Georgian war and its resolution suggest this potential is limited, or at least
unlikely to be realized.
Some PrefatoryNotes on Methodology andPurpose
Suggesting, as I am going to, that Russia's actions were not illegal in the
way the United States claimed does not imply approval. Nor does it mean Russia
acted legally in all ways: Observers have credibly claimed that Russia, South
Ossetia, and Georgia all violated specific aspects of the jus in bello, through
indiscriminate killing, deportations, or violations of the duties of an occupying

3
See HALVARD BUHAUG, ScOTr GATES, HAvARD HEGRE & HAvARD STRAND, PEACE
RESEARCH INSTITUTE OSLO (PRIO),
GLOBAL TRENDS
IN ARMED CONFLICT (2007),

http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/kampanjer/refleks/innspill/engasjement/prio.html?id-492941
(showing the numerical dominance of intrastate over international conflicts between 1946 and 2006).
As a proxy for the likely regulatory burden, consider the current docket of the International Criminal
Court: Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Uganda, Sudan
(Darfur), Kenya, Libya, and Ivory Coast. See Situations and Cases, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-

cpi.int/en menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited
Jan. 22, 2013) (listing the situations and cases in which the International Criminal Court has been
involved). Each ofthese situations concerns an internal conflict.
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force.4 I am not a partisan interested in vindicating Russia's position or attacking
Georgia's; I happen to think that Russia did not commit aggression, and that
Georgia did violate important norms-and these in themselves are important
conclusions. But my point and purpose is to show why those conclusionsplausible and perhaps the best view, yet so different from what the West was able to
argue at the time-demonstrate something defective in the structure of international
law as we now have it, and how the curious, contrarian indications we can derive
from that structure point the way toward a radically different model, not only for
the use of force, but for territory and sovereignty.
Methodologically, this Article draws on statements by policymakers in the
United States to build its argument. The choice is not arbitrary: The United States
is Georgia's most conse uential ally and the leading actor in NATO, which Georgia
had been hoping to join. In general, the United States made some of the strongest
critiques of Russia, but the views of the main Western powers were not far apart,
78
as mutually reinforcing declarations and joint NATO statements show. Nor do I

4

See generally AMNESTY INT'L, CIVILIANS IN THE LINE OF FIRE: THE GEORGIA-RUSSIA

CONFLICT (2008), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4922cOb22.html (describing violations of the
jus in bello by the parties to the conflict); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UP IN FLAMES: HUMANITARIAN
LAW VIOLATIONS AND CIVILIAN VICTIMS IN THE CONFLICT OVER SOUTH OSSETIA (2009),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/georgia0109web.pdf (also describing violations of the jus
in bello).
s See Press Release, N. Atl. Treaty Org., Bucharest Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads
of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council T 23 (Apr. 3,
2008), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official texts_8443.htm (acknowledging Georgia's desire
for NATO membership and supporting the development of a Georgian Membership Action Plan
following "high political level" engagement); see also NA TO's Relations with Georgia, N. ATLANTIC
TREATY ORG., http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_38988.htm (last updated Dec. 5, 2012)
(describing Georgia's involvement with NATO, including Georgia's participation in NATO's
Partnership for Peace starting in 1994, which was itself a source of tension with Russia in the run-up to
the war).
6
France occupied a middle position, and Germany and Italy showed the greatest
accommodation. Jonathan Eyal, 'We are Extremely Concerned': The EU and Georgia, ROYAL UNITED
SERVICES INST. (Aug. 11, 2008), http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C48AOB419E4BCA/#.
UMWVMeOe8UU (noting that Italy sided with Russia and that "Europe remains divided between its
East and West, and Western European governments simply do not feel the same urgency about
Russia"); Angela Merkel Calls for Immediate Ceasefire, BUNDESREGIERUNG [GERMAN FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AND CHANCELLOR] (Aug. 11, 2008), http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/daparchive/
anzeige.php?zaehler-12679 (focusing almost exclusively on the mutual need to prevent violence,
engage in mediation, and provide humanitarian assistance; there is no attempt to characterize the
conflict in legal terms). Some of France's positions are noted below.
See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Statement by the Press Secretary on EU
Decision Regarding Georgia (Sept. 1, 2008), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
s/2008/09/20080901-15.html ("We join the EU in condemning Russia's decision to recognize the
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and in calling on other states not to recognize these
Georgian separatist regions.").
8
See Press Release, N. Atl. Treaty Org., NATO-Georgia Joint Press Statement on the Occasion
of the North Atlantic Council Visit to Georgia and the Inaugural Meeting of the NATO-Georgia
Commission (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-22231725-669CEED9/natolive/news46438.htm.
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assume the United States is monolithic'-though in August 2008 the range of
opinions was quite uniform, with disagreement centered on how the United States
should respond. 0
For the events of the war, I rely on what we may call the standard
account-drawn from journalistic sources like the BBC, New York Times, and Der
Spiegel, and the EU's Tagliavini Report"-and the claims of the war's major
actors themselves. Although there is never consensus on matters of war,12 outside
of partisan circles there is broad agreement on the events of early August 2008. If
the facts turn out to be different, my conclusions might be different-remembering
that it is the facts known by the parties at the time that matter. However, I am not
advancing a subjective theory of responsibility-the idea that each party's belief in
the rightness of its cause and its legal interpretations should be determinative.
Doubtless both Georgia and Russia felt entirely justified and believed, too, that they
were not violating any laws, but this tells us little about the existing law itself.
On the contrary, I assume that plural and conflicting positions exist within the state-and at
the same time, that the state is in fact the predominant legal fiction about and through which legal
claims are analyzed. Cf MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 12-13 (1961)
(cautioning against describing actors in international processes as states, rather than the individuals
within them: "For purposes of precision in description . . . as well as for the application of certain
sanctioning procedures, such as those providing for criminal liability, one must frequently go behind
the institutional abstraction 'state' and refer to the effective decision-makers . . . .").
'o Even candidates Obama and McCain, locked in a fierce election campaign, were largely in
agreement in condemning Russia, differing mostly on the manner of response. See CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERV., RUSSIA-GEORGIA CONFLICT IN SOUTH OSSETIA: CONTEXT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
U.S. INTERESTS 105 (2008) (noting that both McCain and Obama condemned the Russian military
incursion, with McCain "warn[ing] Russia that there could be severe, long-term negative consequences
to its relations with the United States and Europe" and Obama "call[ing] for Georgia to refrain from
using force in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and urg[ing] all sides to pursue a political settlement that
addresses the status of the regions").
" See generally INDEP. INT'L FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN GEOR., REPORT
vols. 1-3 (2009), available at http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html [hereinafter TAGLIAVINI REPORT]
(describing the August 2008 conflict, along with relevant background material on the region's history,
legal issues, and international resolution efforts). This report was assigned by the EU to an independent
fact-finding mission. Id. vol. I at 2.
12
See Paul A. Goble, Defining Victory and Defeat: The Information War Between Russia and
Georgia, in THE GUNS OF AUGUST 2008: RUSSIA'S WAR IN GEORGIA 181 (Svante E. Cornell & S.
Fredrick Starr eds., 2009) (discussing the lack of legitimate fact-finding mechanisms on which to rely
in evaluating international conflicts); Tyler B. Musselman, Note, Skirmishing for Information: The
Flaws of the International Legal System as Evidenced by the Russian-Georgian Conflict of 2008, 19
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 317, 337 (2010).
3
focus on comments made during the actual fighting and its immediate aftermath. I make use
of later analysis to clarify points about the known record and to test my core claims. At the same time,
there is parsimony in focusing on the conflict period when the outcome was still unclear; the
contemporaneous responses of officials are valid data in and of themselves. For a discussion of how
officials in the warring states and media presented the conflict, see Hans-Georg Heinrich & Kirill
Tanaev, Georgia & Russia: Contradictory Media Coverage of the August War, 3 CAUCASIAN REV.
INT'L AFF. 244 (2009) (discussing media coverage of the war, which the authors find was initially
favorable to Georgia, and then became more skeptical); James V. Wertsch & Zurab Karumidze,
Spinning the Past: Russian and Georgian Accounts of the War of August 2008, 2 MEMORY STUD. 377
(2009) (examining Russian and Georgian media narratives).
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In any case, my argument does not depend solely on a particular factual
basis; its conclusions in fact derive equally well from a hypothetical scenario. 14
The legal regime had certain contours on August 6th, 2008, and it was against those
contours that events played out and were interpreted. It is far less consequential
that the facts are or are not clear than that the law governing those facts was
systematically misinterpreted because it is, in discrete ways, defective. Indeed, it
should be entirely possible for a Russian, South Ossetian, or Georgian partisan
advocate to agree with my conclusions about the law, what it speaks to, and what it
doesn't-though that might require particularly cold blood.
Finally-and here we move between questions of method and the argument
itself-we need some theory of the relationship between law, language, and
politics. Legal scholarship has largely abandoned antique pretensions that its
doctrinal categories operate independently from politics.' 5 Indeed, some theories
assign such strong value to language in shaping behavior that they (perhaps
indirectly) assert the power of language and legal concepts to control choices. 6
Still, for theorists of international relations and political science-and for most of
the legal academy-realist assumptions counsel against casually supposing that
law's categories directly control interests; at most, law affects perception in the
See infra text at page 225.
15 See Jack M. Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1831, 1842 (1991).
Balkin observed:
[L]egal discourse was permeable to political discourse and vice versa. The two were so
similar, and so deeply intertwined in their common forms of expression, that it was no
accident that legal argument and political argument moved in lock step. Thus, lawyers and
judges were not making legal arguments in order to cover up political arguments that they
dared not openly express. Rather, they were always making political arguments because the
basic forms of legal and political discourse were identical, or at the very least shared large
elements in common.
Id. See also, Brian Bix, Law as an Autonomous Discipline, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL
STUDIES 975, 982 (Peter Cane & Mark V. Tushnet eds., 2003), http://ssm.com/abstract=1010995
(noting that "[iun the United States, the political nature of law . . . is widely accepted"); Richard A.
Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 767
(1987) ("[M]any fields of law today are deeply entangled with political questions.").
16 See Ruti Teitel, TransitionalJurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation,
106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2077 (1997). Teitel stated:
Transitional jurisprudence examines the way law mediates such periods and constructs the
transition, thereby describing this bounded domain. ... Legal practices in such periods reveal
a struggle between two points, between settled and revolutionary times, as well as a
dialectically induced third position. Persistent dichotomous choices arise as to law's role in
periods of political change: backward versus forward, retroactive versus prospective,
continuity versus discontinuity, individual versus collective, law versus politics. Transitional
legal mechanisms mediate these antinomies.
Id. For different views of the effect of language or concepts on action, see generally JOHN M. CONLEY
14

& WILLIAM M. O'BARR, JUST WORDS: LAW, LANGUAGE AND POWER (1998); HELLE MALMVIG,
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION: A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF INTERVENTIONARY AND NONINTERVENTIONARY PRACTICES IN KOSOVO AND ALGERIA (2006); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,

PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1968); Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Beyond Abyssal Thinking:
From Global Lines to Ecologies ofKnowledge, EUROZINE (June 29, 2007), http://www.eurozine.com/
articles/2007-06-29-santos-en.html.
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same way language does more generally, and serves as an efficacious tool for
advancing policy preferences.' 7 And I largely agree: Although I argue that the law
of aggression as we now have it leaves a great deal off the table, and that its
categories and forms serve as distracting "enchanted" tools,I I am emphatically not
suggesting that policymakers are caught in some Whorfian trap constructed from
their own statements about what the law is-though if one's own preferred theory
supposed that legal language actually determined people's politics, a defective law
of aggression would be even more problematic. The effect I describe is more
marginal than that, if no less consequential: The inadequate, misleading vocabulary
with which we discuss modem war does not make our choices defective, but
indicates where our values and assumptions are.
I.

THE SOCHI REGIME: INTERNATIONALIZING AND FREEZING AN
INTERNAL CONFLICT

Writing a history of the relations between the peoples of Georgia, South
Ossetia, Russia, and the Soviet Union would be as thankless as it is beyond the
scope of this Article. For many outsiders, the region and its vicissitudes are
obscure; others with connections to the Caucasus may be quite familiar with the
basic outlines,19 though it is precisely because those familiar with the conflict have
reasons to be that their disagreement on the details and interpretations of that

history is so foundational and so irreconcilable.
Suffice it to say-insufficient as it is-that in the waning days of the
Soviet Union, the extant political and territorial dispensation was challenged at
multiple levels: Georgia challenged the continued authority of Moscow and, at the
same time, the internal autonomy of units within its territory. One of those units,
the autonomous oblast of South Ossetia, challenged Georgia's authority, demanding
heightened, republican status and eventually independence. The relationship

between these two processes was dynamic. The situation was quite tense from
1989; significant fighting-a shooting war, really-broke out in January 1991 and

" See Christopher Borgen, The Language of Law and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers
and the Rhetoric ofSelf-Determination in the Cases ofKosovo and South Ossetia, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1
(2009) (discussing the role of language in law and politics with reference to the Georgian-Ossetian
conflict).
18 Cf DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIANISM xviii, 279 (2005) (elaborating on how the tools of humanitarian and human rights
work are "enchanted," becoming themselves the focus of attention in lieu of substantive engagement).
19 For background on the conflict and the region, see generally TIM POTIER, CONFLICT IN
NAGORNO-KARABAKH, ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA: A LEGAL APPRAISAL (2001); THE GUNS OF
AUGUST 2008, supra note 12, at 181; THOMAS DE WAAL, THE CAUCASUS: AN INTRODUCTION (2010);
Gerard Toal, Russia's Kosovo: A Critical Geopolitics of the August 2008 War Over South Ossetia, 49
EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY & ECoN. 670, 673-84 (2008) (discussing the historical, political and
geographical aspects of the conflict).
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continued sporadically past Georgia's full, formal independence in December
1991.20

At least 250 people died during the conflict-not a particularly long or
large war, but serious and violent, especially in relation to the quite small
population of the contested area; the fighting was marked by atrocities. 21 Large
numbers of people were displaced in both directions-Georgians from South
Ossetia, Ossetians from Georgia (with some fleeing into North Ossetia, in Russia).
Soviet and Russian forces were directly involved in the fighting. In June 1992, at
war's end, the Russian-backed separatist South Ossetia controlled most of the
territory of the former oblast, with Georgia holding areas in the southeast and
enclaves near Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital.
Whatever one's own preferred interpretation concerning the causes of the
initial conflict and Russia's involvement in it, the resolution was an international,
diplomatic solution-the so-called Sochi Agreement, 23 which established the
security regime with whose operation and misinterpretation we are principally
concerned. At Sochi, the parties-Georgia, Russia, and South Ossetia-agreed to a
set of arrangements that created or altered legal rights and obligations: The
Agreement established a ceasefire, committed the parties to withdraw forces and
take various steps to demilitarize the conflict, provided for the delineation of what
became known as the "zone of conflict," and established a number of institutions,
including a Joint Control Commission and the Joint Peacekeeping Forces.
The Joint Control Commission (JCC) was established to "exercise control
the
implementation of cease-fire, withdrawal of armed formations, disband of
over
forces
of self-defense and to maintain the regime of security in the region[.]" 24
[sic]
20 See INT'L CRISIS GRP., GEORGIA: AVOIDING WAR INSOUTH OSSETIA REPORT NO. 159, at 2http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPANO 9224.pdf
(2004),
5
[hereinafter ICG, REPORT No. 159] (discussing general background to the conflict).
21 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/HELSINK, BLOODSHED IN THE CAUCASUS: VIOLATIONS OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE GEORGIA-SOUTH OSSETIA CONFLICT 2 (1992),
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/pdfs/g/georgia/georgia.923/georgia923full.pdf ("The armed conflict
in South Ossetia included the shelling (by both sides) of both Georgian and Ossetian villages,
blockades, and hostage-taking, claiming at least 250 lives, and wounding at least 485.").
22 The autonomous region of Abkhazia also broke free of Georgia's control around this time.
See generally Michael Toomey, August 2008 Battle of South Ossetia: Does Russia Have a Legal
Argument for Intervention?, 23 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 443 (2009) (discussing challenges to
Georgia's effective control of territory and declarations of independence).
23 Soglashenie o printsipakh uregulirovaniia gruzino-osetinskogo konflikta (COFIAIEHHE o
upHHuHnax yperynuposaHHs rpy3lHO-OCCTHHCKOrO KOH4IHKTa) [Agreement on Principles of
Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict] Geor.-Russ., June 24, 1992, translation available at
http://www.rrc.ge/law/xels 1992_06_24_e.htm?lawid=368&lng_3=en [hereinafter Sochi Agreement].
It is also known as the Dagomys Agreement. Some texts add "between Georgia and Russia" to the
document's title-a not insignificant difference. See also INT'L CRISIS GRP., GEORGIA'S SOUTH
OSSETIA CONFLICT: MAKE HASTE SLOWLY REPORT NO. 183 (2007), http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/me
ICG,
[hereinafter
dia/Files/europe/ 183_georgia s south ossetia conflict make haste slowly.pdf
REPORT NO. 183] (discussing the agreement in a report shortly before the 2008 conflict).
24 Sochi Agreement, supra note 23, art. 3(1) (incorporating by reference the military observers
established in the earlier Kazbegi Agreement); see also ICG, REPORT No. 183, supra note 23, at 1.
ICG, REPORT NO. 183 states:
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The JCC had representation from Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia, and North
Ossetia (itself a component of Russia). This arrangement was quite favorable to the
separatists and to Russia, and Georgia was never really satisfied with it.25 The JCC
met infrequently in later years, and shortly before the war, Georgia suspended its
participation and proposed altering the composition of the JCC to replace North
Ossetia with the provisional South Ossetian government recognized by Georgia, as
well as representation for the EU and the OSCE.26 Russia continued to support the
existing framework, however, and Georgia did not formally leave the institutions
until the August 2008 war.
The Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), established on the basis of the
Sochi Agreement, were composed of Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian units-the
last notionally from North Ossetia, but in fact mostly composed of South Ossetian
forces. 2 7 The JPKF was responsible for maintaining the peace and limiting the use
of force, but had weak rules of engagement; given the poor relationship between its
constituents, it was "not a joint force, but rather separate battalions, more loyal to
their respective sides than to the peacekeeping chain of command.",28
The language of Sochi and its accompanying documents is not very clear
or specific, so it is open to a variety of interpretations. Regulations agreed to in
2004, for example, specify a range of activities in which the peacekeepers might
use force. 29 The main constraints are the absence of any clear provisions providing
for the consequences of a breach of the agreement, or allowing peacekeepers from
The JCC was tasked to supervise observance of the agreement, draft and implement conflict
settlement measures, promote dialogue, devise and carry out measures to facilitate refugee
and IDP return, solve problems related to economic reconstruction and monitor human
rights. Additionally it was to coordinate the activities of the Joint Peace Keeping Forces.
Id.
25 See Vladimir Socor, South Ossetia Joint Control Commission Ingloriously Mothballed,
EURASIA DAILY MONITOR (Mar. 7, 2008), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no-cache=1&txttnews[
tt-news]=33440 ("The JCC's single purpose and relevance was as a tool for freezing the RussiaGeorgia conflict in South Ossetia. In this aspect alone the JCC had proven its effectiveness from its

inception in 1992 to the present.").
26 See Civil Georgia, Tbilisi Proposes New NegotiatingFormatfor S Ossetia,CIVIL.GE (Mar. 1,
2008), http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17244.
27
1 TAGLIAVINI REPORT, supra note 11, at 14; ICG, REPORTNO. 183, supranote 23, at 17-18.
28 ICG, REPORT NO. 183, supra note 23, at 17 (citing an interview
with an unnamed
international expert).
29 Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russ. Fed'n, Polozhenie ob Osnovnykh
Printsipakh Deyatel'nosti
Voennykh
Kontingentov i Grupp
Voennykh Nablyudatelei,

Prednaznachennykh dlya Normalizatsii Situatsii v
(HOJIO)KEHHE 06 OCHOBHbIX upHHIHIaX AC51TIbHOCTH

Zone

Gruzino-osetinskogo

BOCHHbIX KOHT4HreHTOB H

rpyln

Konflikta

BOCHHLIX

npegHa3HaeHHhix AJIR HOpMaJ1H3a1HH cHTyauHH B 30He rpy3HHO-OCeTHHCKOrO
RoH JIHKTa) [Regulation on the Basic Principles of the Military Contingents and Military Observers
Group, Intended to Normalize the Situation in the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict] (June 4, 2004),
http://www.mid.ru/BRP_4.NSF/0/2bd92ad3afaO9703c3256ea90022457fOpenDocument
[hereinafter
2004 Regulations] (giving the text of the Regulations). The 2004 Regulations authorized the
peacekeeping forces to keep the peace and ensure control over the zone of conflict (art. 1); respond to
Ha6llOaTenaei,

breaches of the cease-fire (art. 2); disband any irregular forces, prevent armed groups from entering the

conflict zone, deny entry of weaponry and materiel into the zone, and assist law enforcement in
establishing law and order in the zone (art. 3); patrol, detain or destroy armed groups (art. 4). Id.
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just one side, such as Russia, to use force independently of the joint control
mechanism. Peacekeepers are required to obey an integrated command, and resort
30
to force in response to a breach is determined by the JPKF commander.
Peacekeepers are allowed to suppress violations of the agreement and ceasefire, but
these too are subject to joint command provisions, which make it unclear what
should happen when the violations are caused by one of the parties. Certainly,
Sochi does not give Georgian and Russian peacekeepers any specific, clear-cut
rights to use force in response to actions by the other party that violate the
agreement-in the way that, say, Turkey argued it had specified rights under the
1960 Treaty of Guarantee on which it grounded its later interventions in Cyprus.
In November 1992, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) established its own small mission to monitor the peacekeeping operation,
though its effective scope of operation was often limited, sometimes by the JPKF
itself. 33 Subsequent agreements aimed at developing confidence-building measures
or ensuring a peaceful process. For example, a May 1996 "Memorandum on
Measures to Ensure Security and Reinforce Mutual Confidence Between the Parties
to the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict" outlined further security and confidencebuilding measures and renounced the use of force. 34
Sochi's institutional structure was quite thin-nothing like the dense
international transitional administration established for Kosovo after NATO's
intervention there in 1999, for example.35 The institutions Sochi did create did not
work particularly well-at best, they kept the peace, and often barely that-and
they were clearly not merely technical mechanisms, but rather the outcome of
political, diplomatic and military maneuvering. There is no doubt, for example, that
Russia was generally acting from its own interests rather than as a notionally

30
Sochi Agreement, supra note 23, at art. 3(5) ("In case of violation of provisions of this
Agreement, the Control Conmission shall carry out investigation of relevant circumstances and
undertake urgent measures aimed at restoration of peace and order and non-admission of similar
violations in the future."); 2004 Regulations, supra note 29, art. 2 ("The decision to use troops and
military observers in the event of breach of the cease-fire by a party, is taken by a commander of [Joint
Peacekeeping Force] in order to restore peace, with the notice of JCC.").
31 See INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH,
37ff (Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Steven R. Ratner, & David Wippman eds., 2010) (discussing the Turkish
interventions in Cyprus in 1963 and 1974); David Wippman, Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say
No?, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 607 (1995)(discussing the same).
32 See Meeting Records from the Committee of Senior Officials of the 17th Meeting of the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to the Personal Representative of the CSCE
Chairman-in-Office for Georgia (Nov. 6, 1992), available at http://www.osce.org/georgiaclosed/22213.
ICG, REPORT NO. 183, supra note 23, at 18.
3
34
ICG, REPORT NO. 159, supra note 20, at 5.
See UNMIK: Mandate and Structure, U.N. INTERIM ADMIN. MISSION IN Kosovo,
3
http://www.unmikonline.org/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Dec. 12, 2012); see also Ralph Wilde, Note,
From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of InternationalTerritorialAdministration, 93 AM.
J. INT'L L. 583 (2001) (discussing the structure and role of international administration in Kosovo and
other locations).
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neutral outside actor. Critically, neither Sochi nor any other agreement provided
any clear mechanism for actually resolving the conflicts-whether between South
Ossetia and Georgia or between Georgia and Russia. Attempts to achieve a final
resolution-such as the OSCE's proposal for a constitutional framework in 1994,
or President Mikheil Saakashvili's proposal for Ossetian autonomy within Georgia
in 20053-were unsuccessful.
But effective or not, the institutions and processes were in place, and the
net result was that they constituted an internationally approved regime whose
purpose was to freeze the conflict and limit the ways in which force could be
deployed by any of the parties: the international intervener Russia; the
unrecognized internal claimant South Ossetia; or the notional sovereign Georgia.
Georgia never recognized the separatist South Ossetian regime, but did enter into a
kind of indirect relationship with it. Russia was clearly a strong supporter of the
South Ossetia regime, but did not formally recognize it; it retained forces in South
Ossetia, as did Georgia, but these were now identified as peacekeepers, with
assigned roles and defined numbers. South Ossetia did not gain recognition, but
neither was it compelled to reintegrate into Georgia, and it gained permanent (or at
least indefinite) protection from a powerful neighbor.
The mechanism was international-and with it so was the conflict, in a
way it had not been when it began as a dispute within Soviet Georgia. Russia was
the undeniably dominant military actor in the region, but also tremendously
weakened-after all, 'the region' had, very recently, been part of Moscow's
sovereign imperium; the very idea that Georgia was part of the Near Abroad-a
zone of special influence-was redolent of expansive Russian aspirations, but
equally was evidence of Soviet collapse. 39 Thus what might have been just a few
years earlier a purely internal Soviet, and then Georgian, matter was both clearly
international-Georgia was a recognized sovereign state that entered into
agreements with a sovereign Russia-and internationalized more broadly with the
36 Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Treisman, Why Moscow Says No: A Question
of Russian Interests,
Not Psychology, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 122.
3

See ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION IN EUR., HIGHLIGHTS OF ODIHR ACTIVITIES
IN 1994,

at 3 (1994), availableat http://www.osce.org/odihr/20535.
3 See Tineline: Georgia, BBC (Jan. 31, 2012), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hileurope/country
profiles/1 102575.stm ("2005 January ... President Saakashvili unveils proposals on autonomy within
Georgia for South Ossetia, whose leadership rejects them, repeating demand for full independence.").
3 See Thornike Gordadze, Georgian-RussianRelations in the 1990s, in THE GUNS OF AUGUST
2008, supra note 12, at 3-34; Margarita Antidze, Russia Closes Last Military Base in Georgia,
REUTERS, Nov. 13, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/l 1/13/us-georgia-russiabases-idUSLl387605220071113. The disengagement of Russian forces from Georgian territory was a
protracted affair. When Georgia first declared independence, Soviet military structures were still in
place, many of which were inherited by Russia: Russian forces operated on the Georgian border with
Turkey, and Russia's Transcaucasian Military District had its headquarters in Tbilisi. Russia only
closed its last base in Batumi in 2007, and its forces are still in the disputed areas. See Timeline:
Georgia, supra note 38 (listing on the timeline for 2007 that "Russia says it has withdrawn last troops
[sic] based in Georgia since 1991 collapse [sic] of the Soviet Union, but retains a presence in the
breakaway provinces").
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involvement of the OSCE, through which the United States and Western European
states accepted and even approved this arrangement.
Over the next decade and a half, there were numerous provocations and
violations-an outsider would say "committed by all sides," without necessarily
40
From 2004, tensions in the region
implying any moral or legal equivalence.
increased considerably, nearly returning to open war, as the new Georgian
government under President Saakashvili made renewed efforts to bring South
Ossetia back under its sovereign control, including recognition of an alternative
government for South Ossetia that Georgia sought to incorporate into the existing
peacekeeping mechanisms. 4 1 But for all of those, and the violence that in fact
accompanied these events, the conflict did not reach anything like the level of force
of its early phase. Unhappy as each side may have been with the behavior of the
other, all were willing to concede the continuing legitimacy of the ceasefire regime;
none were willing to openly declare the entire mechanism illegitimate or in
desuetude. This was to change radically with the war in August 2008.
II.

NOT 1968: U.S. CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE WAR

There were many indications in mid-2008 that a war between Russia and
Georgia was imminent. The tensions of 2004 had never fully subsided, and there
had been a considerable increase in shooting incidents and border incursions over
the preceding months-as well as discussion of4a2 possible Russian retaliation for
More generally, the very fact
Western recognition of Kosovo's independence.
that peacekeeping arrangements had been in place since the early 1990s suggested
what eve rone understood: that this so-called "frozen conflict" might unfreeze at
any time.

40
For some, especially on the Georgian side, this will seem inadequate; the decision to use force
in 2008 cannot be separated from the progressive insults and incursions by the South Ossetians and
their Russian patrons. See infra note 120 (discussing the theory of accumulated basis self-defense).
41
Timeline: Georgia, supra note 38. During this period the new government in Georgia
successfully reincorporated the autonomous Adjaria region (May 2004), and shortly thereafter
reclaimed control of the Kodori Gorge region in Abkhazia (July 2006). Id. See also Nikolai Topuria,

Georgia Takes Control of Renegade Region, Sets Sights on Two Others, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,

May 6, 2004, available at http://reliefweb.int/node/146752; Civil Georgia, Tbilisi Turns Kodori into
'Temporary Administrative Center' of Abkhazia, CIVIL.GE (Sept. 27, 2006), http://www.civil.ge/

eng/article.php?id=13654.
See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 4, at 7-8; INT'L CRISIS GRP., RUSSIA vs GEORGIA: THE
42
FALLOUT REPORT NO. 195, at 1-4 (2008) [hereinafter ICG, REPORT NO. 195] (providing a chronology
of events that led up to the conflict); The Chronicle ofa CaucasianTragedy, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Aug.

25, 2008), http://spiegel.de/intemational/world/0,1518,druck-574812,00.html [hereinafter Caucasian
Tragedy].
43

See Jorge Benitez, Russia and Georgia Still Locked in Frozen Conflict, ATLANTIC COUNCIL

(Aug. 15, 2011), available at http://www.acus.org/natosource/russia-and-georgia-still-locked-frozenconflict (reporting more recently on the potential for escalation within the frozen conflict).
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Nonetheless, the outbreak of major hostilities on August 7th, 2008 seems
to have surprised many in the West.44 So, although they had intelligence briefings
and positions-pre-existing views of the conflict and the security arrangementspolicymakers were responding to events in real time over the six-day shooting war
and three-week crisis. Their public statements invoked legal categories that
characterized the war as of a particular kind, in which fault and legal responsibility
were overwhelmingly assigned to Russia.
The earliest comments by U.S. policymakers appear more concerned with
stabilizing the conflict than condemning Russia. The intensity of criticism and the
invocation of juridical categories appear to have increased after combat operations
had largely ended and an overwhelming Russian victory was assured. For example,
in one of his earliest comments on the situation, made in Beijing on August 9th,
President Bush declared:
I'm deeply concerned about the situation in Georgia .... The attacks are
occurring in regions of Georgia far from the zone of conflict in South
Ossetia. They mark a dangerous escalation in the crisis. The violence is
endangering regional peace. Civilian lives have been lost, and others are
endangered. This situation can be resolved peacefully .... Georgia is a
sovereign nation and its territorial integrity must be respected. We have
urged an immediate halt to the violence and a stand-down by all troops.
We call for an end to the Russian bombings, and a return by the parties to
the status quo of August the 6th.45
Bush expressed concern about Russia's actions both directly (ending bombings)
and indirectly (noting Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity). But the
overall message is pragmatically focused on minimizing violent escalation: It
refers to a "situation" and a "crisis." 46
Two days later, back in Washington D.C., Bush expressed harsher
condemnation in language that, both juridically and politically, is much more
prejudicial:

Johanna Popjanevski, From Sukhumi to Tskhinvali: The Path to War in Georgia, in THE

GUNS OF AUGUST 2008, supra note 12, at 143, 145-49, 160 (noting that, before July 2008, the
prevailing assumption was that conflict would break out over Abkhazia rather than South Ossetia).
45 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush Concerned by Escalation of Violence
in Georgia (Aug. 9, 2008), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/08/200808
09-2.html.
46
ICG, REPORT NO. 183, supra note 23, at 32. Since the cease-fire in 1992, there has been a
defined "zone of conflict" running in an East-West zig-zag across the southern part of South Ossetia
and the adjacent territory of Georgia proper, with its northern limit just north of Tskhinvali and its
southern limit just north of Gori. See Toal, supra note 19, at 671 (reproducing maps showing the zone
of conflict). It is possible that President Bush was referring not to this, but instead to only the area in
South Ossetia in which combat was actually taking place (thanks to Jonathan Kulick for this point);
however, later U.S. government statements clearly invoked the legally defined "zone of conflict."
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Russia has invaded a sovereign neighbouring state and threatens a
Such an action is
democratic government elected by its people.
unacceptable in the 21st Century. The Russian government must reverse
the course it appears to be on and accept this peace agreement as a first
step toward solving this conflict. 47
In general, the Bush administration's rhetoric became more assertive over
the course of the crisis, 4 8 and its criticism of Russia also focused on several aspects
of the conflict: the invasion of other parts of Georgia-what came to be known as
"Georgia proper"-as an act of aggression in violation of Georgia's sovereignty
and territorial integrity, and a disproportionate response; recognition of breakaway
regions; charges of ethnic cleansing; and blocking access to Georgia's ports. There
was, throughout, a minor key of ambivalence: Alongside full-throated defenses of
with Georgia
Georgia, there were indications that U.S. policymakers were 4annoyed
9
consistent
the
Still,
responsible.
was
side
which
about
doubts
and even harbored
Russia.
of
critical
is
comments
U.S.
of
and overwhelming tenor
Although these critiques took the form of legal arguments, it is difficult to
say anything about the administration's subjective intentions. It might be that the
administration intensified its rhetoric in response to the changing situation, viewing
the spread of fighting into Georgia proper as a serious escalation; it may have been
genuinely concerned that Russia might press on to Tbilisi, and thus may have been
signaling the Russian leadership about what it considered the acceptable limits of its
war aims. Perhaps U.S. leaders only felt free to deploy harsher rhetoric after the
crisis stabilized-a conscious strategy to compensate for the lack of viable
alternatives to effectively counter Russia.50 With the passage of days, policy
Georgia Conflict: Key Statements, BBC (Aug. 19, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/75568
47
57.stm [hereinafter Key Statements]. The peace agreement to which Bush refers is apparently French
Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner's initial effort rather than the six-point plan finally agreed to.
Steven Lee Myers, No Cold War, But Big Chill Over Georgia, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2008),
48
8
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/0 /16/washington/16assess.html (noting that Bush's statements became
stronger over time).
49 See, e.g., Popjanevski, supra note 44, at 155 (noting that the "the prevailing Western view
after August 2008 is that the Georgian government acted irresponsibly when sending troops into

Tskhinvali...."); Conor Sweeney & Richard Balmforth, Russia's First Georgia Move Legitimate:
U.S. Envoy, REUTERS, Aug. 22, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-Georgia/idUSL

M47889020080822 (discussing U.S. Ambassador to Russia's comments in support of Russia's initial,

though not subsequent, actions); Roy Allison, Russia Resurgent? Moscow's Campaign to 'Coerce

Georgia to Peace',84 INT'L AFF. 1145, 1145 (2008). Allison stated:
The strong support Georgia received for its sovereignty and territorial integrity during this
crisis from western states, for all their initial concerns about Georgia's assault on Tskhinvali,
reflects a robust commitment to Georgian statehood . . .. Th[e] claim of an initial Russian
violation of Georgian territory was received rather skeptically by most western states at first,
and has still not been conclusively corroborated.
Id. Even states supportive of Georgia were, in some cases, uncomfortable with what they perceived to
be the profoundly unwise Georgian decision to begin hostilities.
ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INST., (Aug. 12,
SO See Alexis Crow, The US., Georgia, and Russia,
9 77
48 2
C550/. Crow stated:
A OD
2008), http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C
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positions may have been clarified, and hardened, in internal bureaucratic processes
or coordination with allies. Finally, Western leaders may not have been trying to
craft a legal argument at all, only expressing condemnation in the strongest terms,
which happen to be lexically similar to those law deploys. 51 All of these
possibilities would be consistent with a (to my mind persuasive) realist account that
U.S. leaders and policymakers were pursuing their own interests, as they
understood them, and mustered legal arguments consistent with those interests. In
short, we should not assume U.S. leaders necessarily believed anything particular
about their own legal claims. 52
But whatever their psychological state, U.S. policymakers consistently
condemned Russia's intervention in specific, legally salient ways-and knew they
were doing so. Some comments were extemporaneous or must be understood as
lay characterizations not to be taken literally, 53 but others were issued by
spokesmen and drafted pursuant to interagency coordination norms; 54 individual
policymakers might not have been fully aware of the significance of the terms they
employed, but their advisors surely were.
More generally, policymakers often
make claims with the express intention of locating themselves in or defining
debates about the legality of a given policy. 56 So, even if policymakers were not
In the next five days, the United States continually reassured Georgia that it was a staunch
American ally, and demanded Russia to halt its military actions. Yet many of these
statements were guarded: Bush condemned the Russians for bombing 'outside' of South
Ossetia, and reprimanded Russia for its 'disproportionate response.'
Despite Bush's
insistence that he was 'very firm' with Putin, his statements reflect a cautious tone.
Id.
5' Perhaps policymakers emphasized sovereignty and territory instead of ethnic cleansing
because evidence of the latter often is ambiguous or contested, whereas the fact of invasion-at least of
the kind Russia undertook-is notorious. Even so, this would imply a fastidious caution and a respect
for the integrity of legal argument, rather than the naked instrumentalization of law for political
purposes.
52 See Balkin, supra note 15 ("[T]he fact that
legal discourse is rhetorizable says nothing about
its lack of authenticity. To the contrary, . . . the only type of discourse that is truly authentic is that
which is permissible within our existing language games, and is thus always rhetorizable.").
s3 See Andrew E. Kramer & Clifford J. Levy, Rice, in Georgia,
Calls on Russia to Pull Out
Now, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/16/world/europe/I6georgia.html?
pagewanted=all ("Ms. Rice... referred to the Russians as '21st-century barbarians' who had
essentially raped Georgia.").
54

See ALAN G. WHITTAKER ET AL., THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY PROCESS: THE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND INTERAGENCY SYSTEM 47-48 (2011) (reviewing the role of the

Department of State in the national security policy process, including its role in "[]eading interagency
coordination in developing and implementing foreign policy").
55
Compare Press Release, Condoleezza Rice, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of State, Russia Move into
Georgia (Aug. 8, 2008), http://2001- 200 9.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/08/108083.htm [hereinafter
Rice,
Russia Move into Georgia], with Press Release, Robert Wood, Acting Deputy Spokesman, U.S. Dep't
of State, Russian Actions in Georgia (Aug. 8, 2008), http:// 2 001-2009.state.gov/r/palprs/ps/2008/aug/10
8097.htm [hereinafter Wood] (using identical language to indicate support for Georgia's sovereignty

and territorial integrity in reference to U.N. Security Council resolutions).
5 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, PresidentialSigning Statements and Executive
Power,23 CONST. COMMENT. 307 (2006) (arguing that signing statements allow presidents to express
views on the constitutionality of legislation and can aid in statutory interpretation).
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interested in the legal value of their arguments--even if they viewed legal claims as
purely instrumental-their use of terms such as "aggression" or "territorial
integrity" should be understood as conveying a legal sense, or at least not
contradicting the United States' existing positions on the law.5 Certainly, scholars
analyzing customary law would consider such statements probative.
We will now review the actual comments U.S. policymakers made, by
category, to see how the United States characterized Russia's actions as violations
of international law. We will not spend as much time on characterization of
Georgia's actions, both because U.S. officials did not condemn Georgia and
because Georgia's non-violation was thought to be obvious-though as we will see,
in Part IV, it was not.
A.

Aggression and Violation of TerritorialIntegrity

Aggression refers to the illegal resort to force by one state against
another-"the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. . . .,,60 The only force the
Charter authorizes is either ordered by the Security Council or used in selfdefense, which means that aggression is not simply the first use of force, but its
wrongful use.62 Indeed, aggression is effectively the opposite of lawful force; these
By contrast, reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch avoid "aggression"
5
in their legal analysis. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 4; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4.
5

See generally JEFFERY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS:

A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH (2d ed. 2006) (reviewing the formation of customary international
law).
5
On legal characterizations of the conflict, see generally Borgen, supra note 17; Gregory
Hafkin, The Russo-Georgian War Of 2008: Developing The Law Of Unauthorized Humanitarian
Intervention After Kosovo, 28 B.U. INT'L L.J. 219 (2010). For a polemical defense of the legality of
Russia's actions, see Nicolai N. Petro, The Legal Case for Russian Intervention in Georgia, 32
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1524 (2009).
60 Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3314(XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974); U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or independence of a state); General Treaty for the Renunciation of War
as an Instrument of National Policy arts. I-II (Kellogg-Briand Pact), Aug. 27, 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57
(still valid law in 66 countries). Aggression-a crime against peace and a crime of state-was also
International Military Tribunal Charter art. 6
charged as an individual crime at Nuremberg.
(Nuremberg Charter), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. Resolution 3314's definition, though originally
devised to describe action by a state, was recently adopted by the International Criminal Court for use
in individual criminal cases. The Court's jurisdiction over aggression will not become active until 2017
at the earliest. See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 900; The Review Conference of the International Criminal Court Dec. 22, 2010, INT'L
CRIM. CT. (Dec. 22, 2010), http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/ReviewConference/Crime+of+Aggress
ion.htm.
61 See U.N. Charter arts. 39-42, 51. Self-defense includes collective action-a state may seek
help from its allies.
62 See Larry May, The InternationalCriminal Court and the Crime of Aggression: Aggression,
Humanitarian Intervention and Terrorism, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 321, 325 (2009); Noah

194

STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

49:1

two categories define the universe of interstate violence.63 Doctrinally, aggression
belongs to a separate category from other war crimes-it is addressed in the jus ad
bellum, the resort to war, rather than thejus in bello, the way wars are fought.
"Aggression" was invoked only as the initial military phase of the crisis
came to an end. From about the third day of the conflict, U.S. leaders began
characterizing Russian actions as aggression. On August 11th, for example, U.S.
Vice President Dick Chene7 issued a statement declaring that "Russian aggression
must not go unanswered." 6 On August 12th, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice's spokesman announced that "[w]hat we're calling on is for Russia to stop its
aggression."65 Explicit references to aggression disappeared from the Bush
administration's statements after the ceasefire was agreed, although territorial
integrity continued to be invoked by the United States as well as by Georgia.67
Throughout, administration officials were careful to distinguish between a
legitimate Russian presence in South Ossetia-peacekeepers there under the earlier
Sochi Agreement-and new forces introduced into South Ossetia and Georgia
proper after August 7th.
For their part, Russia and South Ossetia deployed similar language, though
with the opposite valence: As early as the afternoon of August 7th, South Ossetian
authorities reported "large-scale military aggression against the Republic of South
Ossetia," 68 -consistent with their self-perception as a sovereign state. Though it
had not recognized South Ossetia's independence, the next day "Russia warn[ed]
Georgia that its 'aggression' will not go 'unpunished."'69 Russian use of the term
Weisbord, ConceptualizingAggression, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1 (2009) (discussing the concept

of "first wronging"). There is also a component of seriousness. See infra notes 115-123 and
accompanying text.
63 Recently asserted principles of humanitarian intervention contemplate legitimate
interstate
uses of force not approved by the Security Council or undertaken in self-defense. See infra Part IV.
6

Sanjeev Miglani & Matt

Spetalnick,

Cheney:

"Russian Aggression Must Not Go

Unanswered," REUTERS, Aug. 10, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/08/1 1/usgeorgia-ossetia-cheney-idUSN1049425020080811 (citing a statement issued by Cheney's office, which
also referred to "this threat to Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity")
65

See Key Statements, supra note 47.

6

See id. On August 17, Bush referred to Russia's "invading forces."
See Press Release, Declaration of Universal Mobilization by Georgian President Mikhail

Saakashvili (Aug. 8, 2008), http://www.president.gov.ge/en/PressOffice/News?2324.
stated:

Saakashvili

As you all know, we initiated military operations after separatist rebels in South Ossetia
bombed Tamarasheni and other villages under our control .

..

. A large-scale military

aggression is taking place against Georgia. Over the past few minutes and hours, Russia has
been bombing our territory and our urban areas. This can only be described as a [sic] classic
international aggression.
Id. Saakashvili referred to Russian aggression in most of his speeches. Descriptions of Russian actions
as aggression predate the war. See Anne Penketh, Georgia Says Russia Fired Missile in "Act of
Aggression ", INDEPENDENT (London) (Aug. 8, 2007), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/

europe/georgia-says-russia-fired-missile-in-act-of-aggression-460672.html.
68 Caucasian Tragedy, supra note 42 (quoting unnamed South Ossetian authorities).
69 Alexis Crow, Georgia-Russia Conflict Timeline (Includes South Ossetia and Abkhazia),
ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INST. (Aug. 11, 2008), http://rusi.org/research/studies/european/commentary/
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aggression was oriented, from the start, to the harm to its peacekeepers and its
rights under Sochi. On August 8th, President Medvedev declared:
Last night, Georgian troops committed what amounts to an act of
aggression against Russian peacekeepers and the civilian population in
South Ossetia. What took place is a gross violation of international law
and of the mandates that the international community gave Russia as a
70
partner in the peace process.
On August 19th, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used the term
"aggression" when criticizing a summit statement issued by the North Atlantic
Council:
The declaration above all appears unobjective and biased, because there's
not a word about how all this started, why it happened, who started the
aggressive action and who armed Georgia .... It appears to me that Nato
is trying to portray the aggressor as the victim, to whitewash a criminal
regime and to save a failing regime. 7 '
Unsurprisingly, "all sides have declared their own actions to be
'defensive"' 7-that is, as falling within the one exception to the prohibition on
force that the U.N. Charter clearly identifies. Needless to say, no U.S. official
ref:C48AO8074B93E4. Russia used the term "'aggression"' liberally, even before the war. See, e.g.,
Kazbek Basayev, Russia Accuses Georgia of Open Aggression, REUTERS, July 4, 2008, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL04712416. CH_.2400 (reporting Russian accusations that
Georgia killed two people in a mortar raid against South Ossetia). Basayev commented:
"Moscow considers it unacceptable when Tbilisi . . . is committing undisguised acts of
aggressions [sic] against South Ossetia,["] the Russian foreign ministry said in a statement.
"The recent military incidents will lead to a sharp escalation in the armed confrontation in
the conflict zone," it said. "Any further delays in resuming the negotiations process could
lead to the most tragic consequences."
Id. (ellipsis in original).
70 Press Release, Dmitry Medvedev, President of Russ., Statement on the Situation in South
Ossetia (Aug. 8, 2008) [hereinafter South Ossetia Statement], http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/20
08/08/08/1553_type82912type82913_205032.shtml.
71 Key Statements, supra note 47.
72 AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 4, at 6. Russia's claims to be defending its own passport-holding
citizens and peacekeepers are discussed in Part III.
" U.N. Charter art. 51 (providing for a right of self-defense). I have not found any side
claiming that their actions were directly authorized by the Security Council, though it is common for
states to claim implicit authorization from ambiguously worded prior resolutions, or from the Council's
silence. Russia does claim that the basis for its subsequent recognition of the separatist regions is the
U.N. General Assembly Declaration 2625 on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States, and there was Security Council action on Abkhazia earlier
that year. See S.C. Res. 1808, 1 1318, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1808 (Apr. 15, 2008) (covering settlement of
the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and extension of the mandate of the U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia).
The United States invoked this same resolution to oppose Russia's military actions in Georgia proper.
See infra note 77.
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characterized Georgia's actions as aggression-and this is logical enough, since at
no point did Georgian forces leave the territory of their own state.
U.S. condemnation of Russian aggression was often linked to the closely
related concept of territorial integrity, which is the "cornerstone" of the U.N.
Charter's prohibition on the use of force. 74 As the definition of aggression implies,
a state's territorial integrity and sovereignty are protected against interstate
violence. Sovereignty is a notoriously vague concept,75 but territorial integrity is
straightforward in principle: A state's physical territory is protected against
unwanted incursions by other states.
As early as August 8th-the first full day after the conflict broke out-the
United States described Russia's actions as a violation of territorial integrity,77 and
continued to invoke this description throughout the crisis, as on August 15th, when
Secretary of State Rice declared that:
Georgia has been attacked. Russian forces need to leave Georgia at once.
The world needs to help Georgia maintain its sovereignty, its territorial
integrity and its independence. This is no longer 1968 and the invasion of
Czechoslovakia ... when a great power invaded a small neighbour and
overthrew its government. The free world will now have to wrestle with
the profound implications of this Russian attack on its neighbour ... . 7 8

74 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
2005 I.C.J. 168, T 148 (Dec. 19).
7
See MALMVIG, supra note 16, at 1-22; MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 333-34
(4th ed. 1997). International documents more commonly refer to "sovereign equality."
76 See DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 83; see, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state "or in any othgr
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations"); id. at para. 7 (prohibiting interference
with a state's domestic jurisdiction); Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 26/25, Annex art. 1, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV) (Oct.
24, 1970) ("Every state has the duty to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."). The Helsinki Final Act defines sovereignty to
include "in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom
and political independence." Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, Aug. 1,
1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292, available at http://www.osce.org/mc/39501. Analyzing violations of territorial
integrity proves much more difficult in practice-defining the scope of "interference with a state's
domestic jurisdiction" or "political independence" is a complex definitional and line-drawing exercise.
7
Rice, Russia Move into Georgia, supra note 55. Rice stated:
We call on Russia to cease attacks on Georgia by aircraft and missiles, respect Georgia's
territorial integrity, and withdraw its ground combat forces from Georgian soil .... We
underscore the international community's support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial
integrity within its internationally recognized frontiers, as articulated in numerous U.N.
Security Council resolutions, including ... 1808....
Id.
7

earlier).

Key Statements, supra note 47 (citing Rice using very similar language about 1968 two days
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As with aggression, U.S. officials did not describe all Russian actions
within Georgia as violations of territorial integrity: Vociferous U.S. opposition to
the invasion coexisted with acknowledgement that some Russian forces were
legally based in South Ossetia, a position the United States never repudiated. U.S.
claims that Russia was violating Georgia's territorial integrity referred to actions by
forces operating outside Sochi's operational and territorial mandate; this meant both
additional forces within South Ossetia and all forces operating in other parts of
Georgia.
One implication of framing the conflict according to the norms of
territorial integrity and aggression was the concomitant view that Georgia was
acting within its own sovereign sphere-an internal matter. For the United States
this was largely a given; for Georgia, it was the express justification for its actions.
Thus on the evening of August 7th, "the Georgian side informed the general in
charge of the Russian peacekeepers that they planned to use military force to reestablish "constitutional order" in the Tskhinvali Region, the Georgian term for
South Ossetia . . . ."79 This made perfect sense, as all Georgian operations took
place within its international borders, which even Russia recognized. As with
aggression, so with territorial integrity: The idea of even describing Georgia's
actions on its own territory in terms drawn from the jus ad bellum would have been
not only contrary to the political sensibilities of the United States and Georgia's
allies, but almost nonsensical.
Russian leaders also framed the debate in terms of territorial integrity-but
to a very different purpose and from a very different perspective. Initially they
claimed they were not encroaching on Georgia's territorial integrity in any way
because their forces were operating in a pre-agreed framework; they became openly
dismissive of Georgia's territorial claims after it became clear Russia had prevailed
decisively in the conflict.so Later, Russia directly challenged Georgia's territorial
79 Caucasian Tragedy, supra note 42; 3 TAGLIAVINI REPORT, supra note 11, at 595-626
(referring to the supposed "Order No. 2"); see also Michael Cecire, Doubting Der Spiegel-What is
OrderNo. 2?, GEORGIAN DAILY (Apr. 27, 2009), http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=comcon
tent&task-view&id=11271&Itemid=130 (calling into question a Der Spiegel article that blamed
Georgian leadership for the Georgian War). General Kurashvili made a similar comment on television,
but other Georgian officials distanced themselves from this characterization. See Email from Jonathan
Kulick, Advisor, Office of the State Minister of Geor. for Reintegration, to author (Nov. 13, 2010) (on
file with author). These comments about reasserting constitutional order are controversial because they
are thought to show Georgian premeditation, but they also indicate a view of the conflict's nature:
Georgia was restoring its sovereignty over its own territory, which is what any state might be expected
to do. As Professor Gotz notes, the phrase is "the basis of virtually any country's decision to reestablish control over breakaway pieces of real estate and mafia dens, ranging from the U.S. South in
1861 to Italian efforts to trim the mob in Sicily." Cecire, Doubting Der Spiegel, supra.
so See ICG, REPORT No. 195, supra note 42, at 9. The report states:
Russia insisted it supported Georgia's territorial integrity, but this language is no longer to be
heard. Prime Minister Putin was the first to state, on 9 August, that 'a fatal blow has been
inflicted on the territorial integrity of Georgia itself, and . .. its own sovereignty.' Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov similarly said on 14 August, 'one can forget any talk about Georgia's
territorial integrity'
Id. (citations omitted).
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integrity with its recognition of the breakaway regions' independence. Throughout,
however, Russia claimed to respect territorial integrity as a principle-the question,
though, was, integrity of what?
I have not found claims by Russia that Georgia's actions during the brief
war violated South Ossetia's territorial integrity-and since Russia had not yet
recognized the independence of South Ossetia, logically it would not have made
such a claim. Still, as we have seen, that hardly stopped Russia from talking about
"Georgian aggression" for actions Georgia took inside its own territory-a logical
and doctrinal inconsistency, though one fully consistent with Russia's evident
preferences about the eventual outcome.
B.

Illegal Occupation and Violation of the Ceasefire

Whether or not a given use of force violates international law, states whose
armies cross a frontier and hold another state's territory against its will 82 are said to
be in occupation and have obligations towards the civilian population and the
displaced sovereign.83 Occupation is not per se illegal, though occupation

"

See infra Part III.C (discussion of Russia's recognition of the separatist regions).

82 See Press Release, Int'l Court of Justice, Georgia Institutes Proceedings Against
Russia for

Violations of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Aug. 12,
2008), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/140/14659.pdf
[hereinafter Racial Discrimination]
(describing three timeframes for Russia's violation of CERD encompassing the entire relevant period);
see also Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections Judgment, 2011 I.C.J. 140, 22 (Apr. 1),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/140/16398.pdf [hereinafter Georgia v. Russian
Federation] (dismissing Georgia's application). Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia under the
Sochi Agreement were generally not thought of as an occupying force, though Georgia now disputes
this. See id.
79, 103 (citing various U.N. documents referring to the peacekeeping forces as a
facilitator between Georgia and South Ossetia, and that shortly before the war, in June 2008, Georgia
had approached Russia "as a facilitator, as a potential guarantor and in terms of its role in the CIS
peacekeeping forces"). See also Bart M.J. Szewczyk, Application of the InternationalConvention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), 105 AM. J.

INT'L L 747, 749, 50 I.L.M. 603 (2011) (discussing the ICJ's view of Russia's role); Alexei Zverev,

Ethnic Conflict in the Caucasus 1988-1994, in CONTESTED BORDERS tN THE CAUCASUS Chapter 1

(Bruno Coppieters ed., 1996), available at http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/ContBorders/eng/chO104.htm
(discussing Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze's efforts to "call[] on Russia, as a guarantor of the
Sochi agreement, to restore the status-quo").
83 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 53, Aug. 12, 1949
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (concerning destruction of property); see also Hague Convention IV
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex arts. 42-56, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 75 U.N.T.S.
287; EYAL BENVENISTI,

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2004) (analyzing the

contemporary law of occupation and identifying the responsibilities of occupiers); George Packer,
Occupation, in CRIMES OF WAR 2.0: WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW 307 (Roy Gutman et al. eds.,

2d ed., 2007), available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/occupation ("Occupiers are also
obliged to look after the welfare of the civilian population, ensuring as far as possible that it has
adequate food, water and medical treatment."); Breven C. Parsons, Moving the Law of Occupation into
the Twenty-First Century, 57 NAVAL L. REv. 1, 1 (2009) (arguing that the "law of occupation has
become somewhat of an afterthought" and is "frequently dismissed as outdated or impractical"); Ariel
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following aggression presumably is, and a legal occupation may become illegal;
occupation is an open-ended prospect, terminated by substantive conditions rather
than a predetermined clock.84 Even if Russia's act of taking and holding territory
were initially legal, it could have become an illegal occupation through subsequent
events; whether or not its occupation was legal, Russia could have violated its
obligations as an occupier.
In the Georgian War, the United States invoked "occupation" much less
often than "violation of territorial integrity," perhaps because occupation is
conventionally a relatively long-term condition-occupation must be "effective,"
not just a fleeting presence on another state's territory-and therefore less apposite
to the running, shooting part of a conflict.85 Instead, Western criticism of the
illegality of Russia's continuing presence was primarily aimed at Russia's failure to
uphold undertakings made in the ceasefire agreement. The agreement, brokered by
French President Nicolas Sarkozy on August 12th and signed by Georgia and
Russia on August 15th and 16th respectively, provided for the cessation of
hostilities and mutual-if asymmetrical-withdrawal of forces, and indicated a
it
further diplomatic process. Whatever obligations Russia may have had before,
with Georgia.87
arguably entered into new ones by signing a ceasefire agreement
Zemach, Taking War Seriously: Applying the Law of War to Hostilities within an Occupied Territory,
38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 645, 660 (2006).
84
Parsons, supra note 83, at 32. Occupations may be legal or illegal. If a state moved forces
into another state with authorization by the Security Council, its actions would be legal but would still
be an occupation. "United Nations (U.N.) governance occupations, such as those in East Timor and
Kosovo and the U.S. and British occupation of Iraq in 2003, are instances of transformative
occupations requiring resort to legal authority outside the traditional law of occupation framework....
[T]hese occupations occurred under legal frameworks authorized by the U.N. Charter and the approval
of the U.N. Security Council." Id. (citations omitted).
BENVENISTI, supra note 83, at 144 (distinguishing between "the course through which the
8
territory came under the foreign state's control" and "the phenomenon of occupation," which he defines
as "the effective control of a power . .. over a territory to which that power has no sovereign title,
without the volition of the sovereign of that country"). Occupation is supposed to be temporary-the
inadequacy of the law in dealing with situations such as the Palestinian territories suggests the problems
that arise when occupation become effectively permanent-but as a legal category it refers primarily to
some period longer than the shooting war; this is why its provisions are concerned to avoid such things
as resettlement of populations. As Benvenisti explained:
The Hague Regulations did not envision that a peace treaty between the rival powers would
take long to reach. In the nineteenth century, military defeats were soon followed by peace
treaties and border modifications, and thus occupations were short lived. The Fourth Geneva
Convention did envision the possibility of protracted occupation. .. . Most of the articles
dealing with occupation, including . .. the occupant's prescriptive powers, are enumerated as
the exceptions that are retained as long as the occupation lasts.
Id.
86
See Text of the Peace Accord, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2008), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/
During negotiations, a set of
packages/pdf/world/2008/08/20080813_GEORGIAACCORD.pdf.
modifications proposed by Georgia was rejected. The final Agreement provides, in full (with the
rejected provisions indicated thusly):
I. No recourse to the use of force
Definitive cessation of hostilities
2.
refugee) )f
Free access to humanitarian aid (and to allow the return
3.
Georgian military forces must withdraw to their normal bases of encampment.
4.
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The signing of the ceasefire appears, paradoxically, to have increased the
level of Western criticism, which-whatever the ambiguities of the early phase of
fighting-now focused on the presence of Russian troops in Georgia proper, and of
new Russian forces in South Ossetia, as ceasefire violations, rather than violations
of general international law. Secretary of State Rice began raising the claim of
ceasefire violations even before the final deal was struck;88 NATO Secretary
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer warned on August 19th that "Russia has to honour
all points in the agreement" or face a freeze in relations. 89 Following Russia's
recognition of South Ossetia's independence on August 26th, the G-7 states
condemned Russia's "continued occupation of parts of Georgia" (referring to
several checkpoints Russia maintained in Georgia proper) and called on Russia to
implement the peace agreement. 90 In September 2008, the State Department said
any further deployments in South Ossetia would violate the agreement.91

5.

Russian military forces must withdraw to the lines prior to the start of hostilities. While
awaiting an international mechanism, Russian peacekeeping troops will implement
additional security measures (simnenths)
6. Opening of international discussions on the modalities of lasting security in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia (based an the deeisien ofthe U.N. and the O.S.C.E.)
Id. In a communiqu6, Sarkozy stated, in relation to point 5:
[T]hesc ... may only be implemented in the immediate proximity of South Ossetia to the
exclusion of any other part of Georgian territory . ... [T]hese "measures" may only be
implemented inside a zone of a depth of a few kilometers from the administrative limit
between South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia in a manner such that no significant urban
zone would be included . . .. Special arrangements must be defined to guarantee the liberty
of movement and traffic along the length of the major highways and railways of
Georgia .... These "additional security measures" will take the form of patrols undertaken
solely by Russian peacekeeping forces at a level authorized by existing agreements.
Communique, President of France Nicolas Sarkozy, Russian Aggression of Georgia: Six Point Peace
Plan (2008), http://mfa.gov.ge/files/557_13910_58261 1_Agreements.pdf. The legal effect on Russia's
obligations of France's clarifications is unclear: They could constitute aids to interpretation, but as post
hoc unilateral pronouncements they would not directly bind Russia.
8 See I.I. Lukashuk, The Principle Pacta Sunt Servanda and the Nature of Obligation Under
InternationalLaw, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 513, 513 (1989) (noting that states generally must respect their

international obligations in good faith, though the legal consequences of not doing so vary

considerably).
88 Press Release, Condoleezza Rice, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of State, Recent Events in Georgia (Aug.

13, 2008), http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/08/108194.htm [hereinafter Recent Events]
(suggesting that Russia was violating a ceasefire). French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner had
earlier broached a different ceasefire plan, and negotiations for the final plan extended from August
12th to 16th, with considerable confusion about when the various parties entered into what obligations.
See Andrew E. Kramer, Peace Plan Offers Russia a Rationale to Advance, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13,

2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/14/world/europe/14document.htmil

(discussing the French-

brokered four-point ceasefire plan).
89 Key Statements, supra note 47 ("That means-and we do not see signals of that happening-

that Russian troops will have to withdraw now to their pre-crisis positions. There can be no business as
usual in our relations to and with the Russian Federation.").
90 See Press Release, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, Joint Statement on Georgia

by Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States and the United
Kingdom (Aug. 27, 2008), http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/aug/108941.htm
Joint Statement on Georgia]. The press release states:

[hereinafter
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South Ossetia-which believed itself an independent state-naturally
characterized Georgian forces on its claimed territor as illegal occupiers, though it
more commonly used the language of aggression. 9 With one exception, Russia
seems not to have used the language of occupation; this would be logical, since it
still acknowledged Georgia's formal sovereignty and a state cannot occupy its own
territory. The likelier reason, however, is that Russia, like South Ossetia, was much
more inclined to refer to Georgian aggression. 93 In any event, given the course of
the war, Georgian forces were not in a position to be accused of occupation for very
long.
C.

Recognition ofBreakaway States

On August 26th, Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. These entities had long claimed independence, but no state had
recognized them. 94 International law places separatists in an ambiguous and
We deplore Russia's. . . continued occupation of parts of Georgia. We call unanimously on
the Russian government to implement in full the six point peace plan . .. in particular to
withdraw its forces behind the pre-conflict lines. We reassert our strong and continued support for Georgia's sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders ....
Id.

9

See Press Release, Sean McCormack, Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, Recent Russian

Actions in Georgia (Sept. 10, 2008), http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/sept/109474.htm.

The

press release comments:
We are extremely concerned about recent statements from the Russian government
indicating that Russian forces will remain permanently in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The
ceasefire agreement . . . obliges Russian troops to withdraw to the positions they held on
August 6. Any additional deployments ... would constitute a violation ....
Id. Several years later, Russia still has forces there, which the United States views as a violation of the
ceasefire. See SABINE FISCHER, THE EU's NON-RECOGNITION AND ENGAGEMENT POLICY TOWARDS

ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA (2010), available at http://www.iss.europa.euluploads/media/NREP_r

eport.pdf.
92 See Iugoosetinski sily vneste s dobrovol'tsami v khode boev otvoevali chast' Tskhinvala
(IOzoocemuHcKue C0bi e6fiecmne c 6o6po6o7bqaLu 6 xode 6oe6 om6oea7u VaCmb LXIHGOwC),
INTERFAX, Aug. 8, 2008, available at http://osgenocide.ru/301-jugoosetinskie-sily-vmeste-s.html

(noting South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity's comment that "Georgian occupiers are being hit
hard"). See generally Materialy za Avgust 2008 goda (MarepHanbl 3a Aerycr 2008 rota) [Material
about August 2008], GENOTSID OSETIN (UEHOUHJi

OCETHH), http://osgenocide.ru/2008/08/

(last

visited Jan. 26, 2013) (documents referring to Georgian occupiers or villages occupied by Georgians,
but with more numerous referring to military aggression by Georgia).
9
The one exception is a statement made on August 9th by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in
an interview with the BBC: "They [Russian troops] have a mandate to liberate the zone of conflict from
violators. Whatever it takes we would do. To stop this is for the Commander-in-chief of the Georgian
army, to give orders to his troops to withdraw from the area they illegally occupied." Press Release,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russ. Fed'n., Interview by Minister of Foreign Affaires of the
Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov to BBC (Aug. 9, 2008), http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/F87A3FB7
Lavrov's initial reference to Russian troops is ambiguous, but
A7F669EBC32574Al00262597.
appears to encompass the additional forces, not just the peacekeepers.
94 South Ossetia and Abkhazia recognized each other in November 2006, and established
diplomatic relationships in September 2007. Abkhaziia i Iuzhnaia Osetiia ustanovili diplomaticheskie
otnosheniia (A6xasus U JOaican Ocemux ycmanoeuu dunzomamuqecKIue OmHOuIeHuq) [Abkhazia and
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difficult position: It is not illegal for a region to secede and constitute a new state,
but neither is there any right to do so. 5 The matter is generally considered
political, but there are strong if ill-defined prohibitions against states supporting or
encouraging secession from other states, as that could violate the territorial integrity
and sovereignty norms of the U.N. Charter.96 An occupier is under a special
obligation to maintain the existing legal system and respect the sovereignty of the
occupied state, which suggests that there is a higher threshold for a state's
recognizing secessionist entities on territory it occupies.97
Western reaction was uniform: "We . .. condemn the action of our fellow
G8 member. Russia's recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia violates the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia and is contrary
to U.N. Security Council Resolutions supported by Russia".
Almost every
Western statement throughout the crisis reaffirmed Georgia's sovereignty and
territorial integrity, insisting that any final deal must be consistent with that
baseline.99 For Western states, non-recognition of the separatists was a necessary
South Ossetia Established Diplomatic Relations], NOVYI REGION (HOBbIA PETHOH), (Sept. 27, 2007),
http://www.nr2.ru/pmr/141972.html; Abkhaziia Iuzhnaia Osetiia i Pridiestrovepriznali nezavisimost'
drug druga i prizvali vsekh k etomu zhe (A6xa3u, IOicuan Ocemuq u Hpuuecmpoebe flpu3Hau
Hesa6UCusMoCmb dpy2 apyea u rptu36alu eceX K 3mOmy
ce) [Abkhazia, South Ossetia and

Transdniestria Recognized Each Other's Independence and Called All Others to Do Likewise],
NEWSRU (Nov. 17 2006), http://www.newsru.com/russia/17nov2006/aup.html.
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, General
Recommendation No. 21: Right to Self-Determination, 6, U.N. Doc. CERD/48/Misc.7/Rev.3 (Aug.
23, 1996), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/dc598941c9e68ala802565le004d3ldO?Ope
ndocument ("[lnternational law has not recognized a general right of peoples unilaterally to declare
secession from a State."). CERD provided the basis for Georgia's (now dismissed) case against Russia
before the International Court of Justice. See Georgia v. Russian Federation,supra note 82, at 115-84.
96 See, e.g., John Dugard & David Raic, The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of
Secession, in SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 95 (Marcelo G. Kohen ed., 2005)
("Recognition of a new State that emerges from the territory of an existing State, without the consent of
the latter, is in most circumstances viewed as a violation of international law."); ALEKSANDAR
PAVKOVIC & PETER RADAN, CREATING NEW STATES: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SECESSION (2007)
(describing the practice of secession through a series of case studies, including low odds of success for
secession); Bridget L. Coggins, Secession, Recognition & the International Politics of Statehood 2
(2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University) (assessing threshold conditions under
which Great Powers find it attractive to recognize secession). If a separatist group establishes de facto
control over a defined territory with a stable population and is capable of entering into diplomatic
relations, other states could recognize it (some scholars add a requirement the claimant must
demonstrate democratic legitimacy), but in practice, recognition is rare without the acquiescence of the
former metropole. Dugard & Raic, supra.
See Parsons, supra note 83 (outlining the obligations of occupation but also arguing that a
changed framework allows occupiers to usurp the occupied state's sovereignty under certain
conditions); see also Grant Harris, The Era of MultilateralOccupation, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1
(2006) (making a similar argument).
98 Joint Statement on Georgia, supra note 90.
99 Interview, Condoleezza Rice, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of State, Interview on the Situation in
Georgia With Charles Gibson of ABC News (Aug. 12, 2008), http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/
2008/08/108171.htm (on the situation in Georgia). Secretary Rice stated:
I think it's important that there is an international mediation going on to find modalities for
moving forward. But I want to make clear a couple of very important principles. Territorial
integrity of Georgia has to be preserved, the democratically elected Government of Georgia
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concomitant of the obligation to respect Georgia's territorial integrity. For Russia,
recognition-justified by Georgia's actions-changed the dynamic, and the
parameters, of negotiations; in particular, it mooted the ceasefire's limitations on its
troop presence, since an independent South Ossetia could simply request that
Russian troops remain, as it quickly did. 00
D.

DisproportionateForce and Jus in Bello Objections

In addition to condemning Russia's resort to force and the territorial
consequences for Georgia, Western leaders also condemned Russia's conduct
during the war-acts generally falling under the jus in bello governing the conduct
and modalities of war, such as disproportionate use of force and acts of ethnic
cleansing. Jus in bello applies to conflicts whether or not lawfully undertaken;102
thus even when Western leaders acknowledged the ambiguity of the initial conflict,
or allowed that Russia might have had some basis for fighting, they still could, and
did, raise criticisms about the way Russia fought.
Indeed, after concerns about territorial integrity violations, claims that
Russia used disproportionate force were the most common criticism from Western
officials, and were voiced by non-state observers as well.io3 On August 17, for
example, U.S. Secretary of State Rice declared that "Russia overreached, used
has to be respected, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are within Georgia's internationally
recognized boundaries, and any resolution of this conflict has got to recognize those
principles.
Id.
'

C.J. Chivers, Russia Keeps Troops in Georgia, Defying Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2009),

http://nytimes.com/2009/04/03/world/europe/03georgia.html (describing Russian forces stationed in
portions of South Ossetia formerly in Georgian hands, even though international monitors were in
place, and noting both that this violates the ceasefire agreement and that Russia has concluded a
bilateral deal with South Ossetia to station troops).
101 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 ("[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or
of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even
if the state of war is not recognized by one of them."); Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A,
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) ("[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force
between states."); CRYER, supra note 2, at 233 ("The paradigmatic situation of international armed
conflict is the resort to force between the military forces of States."). See generally YORAM DINSTEIN,
THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (2004)

(describing how different obligations apply in international and non-international armed conflicts).
102 See ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR

1 (3d ed.

2004).
103

Leading non-governmental rights organizations criticized both Russia and Georgia for

disproportionate use of force. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 4, at 60 (criticizing Georgia for not

adopting measures to protect civilians in Tskhinvali and criticizing Russia for failing to distinguish

military objectives and targets from civilian settlements); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 3

(blaming Georgia's "indiscriminate and disproportionate force" in artillery assaults, and Russia's
indiscriminate "aerial, artillery, and tank fire strikes", and criticizing both sides for the use of cluster
munitions).
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disproportionate force against a small neighbor and is now paying the price for that
because Russia's reputation ... is frankly, in tatters."1 0 4 Some criticisms focused
on aerial bombardment and the targeting or indiscriminate killing of civilians, yet
the main thrust of U.S. critiques was not about the methods of war, but the location:
Repeated statements by Rice emphasized that, whatever the legitimacy of Russian
actions in South Ossetia, carrying the war into Georgia proper was per se
disproportionate.10o That is, in the U.S. critique, disproportionality served primarily
as evidence of ajus ad bellum violation. 106
Western governments were far more cautious about characterizing Russia's
actions as ethnic cleansing or genocide. Ethnic cleansing is an omnibus descriptor
for a number of illegal acts, such as deportation and extermination.10 7 Genocide is
a defined crime: The commission of certain acts (such as killing) with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. 08 Both
Georgia and Russia accused each other of committing genocide or ethnic
cleansing, 109 but Western governments appear not to have given reports of genocide
credit, and did not emphasize complaints about ethnic cleansing nearly as much as
they did the territorial aspects of Russia's incursion.
In sum, the legal categories that U.S. leaders deployed centered on the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. They also demonstrated a patterned
104

Key Statements, supra note 47.

105 Recent Events, supra note 88. Rice stated:

[B]ut ... Russia seriously overreached .... Russia engaged in activities that could not
possibly be associated simply with the crisis in South Ossetia. Bombing civilian targetsbombing targets outside the zone of conflict, some of which have civilian uses, the activities
in Gori, the activities in Poti, destruction of civilian infrastructure-these are hardly moves
that are related to South Ossetia.
Id.; see also Press Release, Condoleezza Rice, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks with French
President Nicolas Sarkozy on the Situation in Georgia (Aug. 14, 2008), http://2001-2009.state.gov/secr
etary/rm/2008/08/108254.htm (calling for enforcement of ceasefire and reiterating support for
Georgia's territorial integrity); Press Release, Condoleezza Rice, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks
with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili (Aug. 15, 2008), http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/
2008/08/108289.htm (demanding an immediate withdrawal of Russian forces).
1o6 We will consider this in detail in Part III.
107 See CRYER ET AL., supra note 2, at 204 (defining deportation
as "forced displacement of
persons by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without
grounds permitted under international law").
'os See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2-3,
approved Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. Genocide is also a crime in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court and the statutes of the other tribunals.
109 See Key Statements, supra note 47 (quoting Russian President Dmitri Medvedev on August
11th: "The ferocity in which the actions of the Georgian side were carried out cannot be called anything
else but genocide. . . ."); Maria Golovnina, Georgia Accuses Russia of Ethnic Cleansing, REUTERS
Aug. 9, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL9329769 (quoting Georgia's National
Security Council Secretary on August 9th: "No doubt about that. Villages that fell under Russian
invasion, those villages are being cleaned out.. . . Pulling out our troops would lead to more ethnic
cleansing by Russian troops."). Both states accused the other of ethnic cleansing at the Security
Council on August 10, 2008. Szewczyk, supra note 82.
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distinction between South Ossetia-identified as a zone in which Russian
peacekeepers were legitimately present and in which Russia had some limited right
to act-and "Georgia proper."o10 Thus claims of "aggression," "violation of
territorial integrity," "illegal occupation" and "ceasefire violations" were voiced
most strongly in connection with Russian incursions beyond the defined zone in
South Ossetia. Likewise, claims about "disproportionate use of force" were most
frequently identified with incursions into Georgia proper, the very performance of
which was seen as an illicit escalation. All of these interpretative moves
emphasized (or at least, suggested) legal features more commonly associated with
the jus ad bellum-the decision to fight-and the consequences for Georgia as a
sovereign territorial state, rather than the particular harms of war.
Georgia's actions, by contrast, were seen very differently in relation to
these categories: However unwise they had been-however difficult a position they
had put the United States and other allies in-because Georgia's uses of force took
place entirely on its own territory, the norms ofjus ad bellum did not even arise.
III.

A CURIOUS OUTCOME: How SHOULD THE LAW CHARACTERIZE WHAT
HAPPENED INTHE WAR?

The 2008 Georgian War was not a conflict over legal definitions. Still,
Western policymakers did claim Russia had violated important international legal
norms, and the most searching condemnations they made concerned jus ad bellum
violations of sovereignty: Russia's actions-invading Georgia, continuing to
occupy territory, recognizing breakaway regions-and critiques of Russia's
disproportionate conduct both implicate a territorial interpretation.
These are curious grounds for legal criticism, because as we shall see,
many of Russia's acts were probably perfectly legal, or at least so indeterminate as
to provide dubious grounds for condemnation. Things that were most clearly
legally improper made up the smallest part of Western critiques. By following the
standard account of events, we can review the conduct of the war against existing
legal norms, remembering those norms are not always clear-a fact that does not
work in favor of the preferred analysis of the Unites States.
A.

Aggression and Violation of TerritorialIntegrity

Russian troops unquestionably invaded Georgia, but Russia probably did
not commit aggression. There had been a chain of incidents and provocations
stretching back several years, but on August 7, 2008, Georgia significantly
escalated the level of conflict, initiating major military operations by shelling and
110U.S. policymakers sometimes conflated the "zone of conflict" with South Ossetia as a whole,
even though parts of the former Soviet South Ossetia Autonomous Oblast had remained under
Georgian control.
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attacking Tskhinvali, killing eighteen Russian peacekeeping troops. I Russia was
evidently ready-probably seeking just such an opportunity-and struck back with
overwhelming force the next day. This sequence is decisive.112
The first serious wrongful use of force normally constitutes aggression.' 13
While the term "first" appears straightforward enough, it will turn out to do very
little independent work. "Serious" means non-trivial; for example, not just a stray
bullet, an accidental crossing of a frontier, or even minor military operations.
Finally, the term "wrongful" is not a moral assessment but means lacking
justification, as in force that was neither authorized by the Security Council nor a
defensive response to some prior use of force or threat. Thus a state does not
necessarily commit aggression merely because it used force first, or because it uses
a serious level of force: it must be serious, unauthorized, and (usually) first-and
these three elements interact.
Let us begin with temporal priority, and see how it quickly implicates
seriousness and wrongfulness. On the standard account, Georgia initiated its attack
on Tskhinvali on August 7th, before Russia's deployment on August 8th. Georgia
contests this, claiming that Russian forces moved through the Roki tunnel from
North Ossetia early on August 7th. Georgia has also claimed it was responding to
prior incidents, of which there had been a well-documented series in the preceding
months, indeed over the previous eighteen years. Those incidents were principally
between Georgian and South Ossetian or Abkhazian units, though some involved
Russian forces.114 If Russia in fact deployed earlier on the 7th, or if these prior
incidents themselves were of sufficient seriousness, then later that day Georgia
could plausibly have been responding to them in self-defense. This in turn could
mean that on August 8th, Russia was not responding, but continuing a conflict it
had begun by an earlier violent action. Let us see how these possibilities work out.
To use force in self-defense, a state must be responding to some prior and
sufficiently serious act. Just as not every cross-border incursion constitutes
aggression, not every incursion gives grounds for the full range of self-defense
measures; although all are violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity, there
must be a measure of gravity or seriousness. "5 A state is not allowed to retaliate
11 See Caucasian Tragedy, supra note 42.

112 War Timeline, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFF. OF GEORGIA, http://www.mfa.gov.ge/
index.php?lang-id=ENG& sec id=556 (last visited Jan. 26, 2013); The Chronology of Russian
Aggression Against Georgia in 2008, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF GEORGIA, http://www.mfa.gov.g

e/files/556 10535_625923_CHRONOLOGYMIA2008.pdf(last visited Dec. 15, 2012).
113 See Definition of Aggression, supra
note 60.

114 For example, Russian forces were involved in the destruction of a Georgian drone over
Abkhazia in April 2008. Martin Malek, Georgia & Russia: The "Unknown" Prelude to the "Five Day
War", 3 CAUCASIAN REV. INT'L AFF. 227, 229 (2009).
1
See Definition of Aggression, supra note 60, at Annex art. 2. The U.N. definition of
aggression states:
The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima
facie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security Council may, in conformity with
the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed
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with massive military force to trivial infringements of its sovereignty; a sustained
bombing campaign in response to an incursion by a drunken soldier would, in legal
terms, be a use of force sufficient to constitute aggression, while the drunken
soldier himself would not.116 But if prior uses of force are serious enough, then
actions taken in response constitute legitimate self-defense.
The terms "first" and "serious" are thus related. The Russian incursion on
August 8th, which involved large armored and infantry formations, sustained aerial
on grounds of
bombardment, and occupation of territory, would clearly qualify
117 But so would the Georgian action the day before.'1 8 If the Russians
seriousness.
were in fact responding to that, they would not be committing aggression. The
standard account says this is what happened, and the Georgian claim that it was
merely responding very quickly to an ongoing Russian incursion (or to South
Ossetian artillery attacks), which began the day before or earlier that day, is
complicated by Georgia's own extensive preparations. Before August 7th, Georgia
reassigned artillery to Gori after the completion of joint Georgian-U.S. operation
Immediate Response 2008 rather than returning them to barracks, made "frantic
requests" for offensive weaponry from Israel, and assembled 12,000 troops on the
Ossetian boundary.11 9 This tends to strengthen the view that Georgia was acting,
and Russia reacting.
And, of course, on August 7th, it was Georgia that sent forces into South
Ossetia and initiated a large, sustained artillery bombardment, before any
would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the
acts concerned or their consequences are not ofsufficient gravity.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Keith A. Petty, CriminalizingForce: Resolving the Threshold Question
for the Crime of Aggression in the Context of Modern Conflict, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 105 (2009)

(discussing threshold considerations for the crime of aggression).

116 Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionalityof Countermeasuresin InternationalLaw, 102 AM. J.

INT'L L. 715, 719-20 (2008). Franck commented that:
Although the law, as refined by judges' decisions, recognizes a right to respond with military
force to an armed attack, it warns as well that this right is not absolute, depending, rather, on
whether the provocation was of such magnitude as to warrant a full-scale military response.
A small border incursion, for example, might not justify a war.
Id. See also May, supra note 62, at 323 ("[I]f one is interested in a definition of aggression that was
normatively persuasive, more is needed than merely a reference to violating territorial integrity or
political sovereignty.").
117 See Definition of Aggression, supra note 60, at Annex art. 3 (providing a non-exhaustive list
of acts constituting aggression).
us Except, of course, that Georgia's action was conducted entirely on its territory-but more on
this shortly.
119 See Caucasian Tragedy, supra note 42. On the other side of the balance sheet are Georgia's

continuing efforts to negotiate a new ceasefire. Here the claims are as polemical as they are poignant.

See, e.g., Damien McElroy, Georgia Conflict: How a Flat Tyre Took the Caucasus to War, DAILY
25
TELEGRAPH (London) (Aug. 16, 2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/

70754/Georgia-conflict-How-a-flat-tyre-took-the-Caucasus-to-war.html (describing a last-minute effort
at negotiations foiled by car trouble). However, it is not clear that they tell us much. It is entirely
possible that Georgia negotiated even as it prepared for war. Indeed, since both Russia and Georgia
engaged in negotiations on August 7th, whichever side started the war was presumably planning to
fight while negotiating. This is normal practice-diplomats occasionally, awkwardly, find themselves
in the enemy capital as the bombs begin to fall.
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comparably serious military action by Russia. Georgia's application to the
International Court of Justice is enlightening in this regard; it accuses Russia of
violating the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination through attacks and expulsions, but does not mention aggression.
The text implicitly concedes the most plausible sequence: The complaint submitted
by the government of Georgia refers to a Georgian "limited operation"followed by
a "well-planned" Russian invasion. 120
So we are required to consider what, if any justification there can be for the
Georgian attack. Plenty of incidents preceded the Georgian attack on August 7th.
There is a view that a sequence of prior incidents, none in itself rising to a sufficient
level of seriousness, can by accumulation constitute a sufficient trigger for a right of
self-defense.121 On this view, Georgia was responding to a string of insults, and in
attacking exactly when it did on August 7th was simply choosing the time and
manner for its legitimate response. 122 Because acts of self-defense, by definition,
do not give rise to a right of response in the other party (who is, after all, an
aggressor by accumulation), Russia's subsequent acts would have been unlawful.
There is certainly a record of violent incidents and provocations going back
to the early 1990s, and accelerating after 2004; less clear is how to characterize the
causal sequencing of these incidents, since it is equally plausible to describe many
of them as the consequence of Georgia's efforts to reassert its constitutional order
in the separatist regions, which would not have been a valid exercise of military
force under Sochi.
It is not clear that any of those prior incidents, alone or cumulated, would
have qualified on grounds of seriousness. No external observer suggested they did
120 See Racial Discrimination, supra note 82, f 77-78. The ICJ Press Release states:
In response to the persistent shelling of ethnic Georgian villages in South Ossetia by
separatist forces, Georgian military forces launched a limited operation into territory held by
ethnic separatists on 7 August 2008 for purposes of putting a stop to the attacks. Seizing the
opportunity to realize its goal of an ethnically homogenous and compliant South Ossetia,
Russia responded with a full-scale invasion of Georgian territory on 8 August 2008.
Beginning in the morning hours of 8 August, several thousand Russian troops invaded
Georgia in a well-planned air and land attack throughout Georgian territory.
Id. Concern about the facts is not the only reason for this strategy, of course: Georgia had limited
jurisdictional options for bringing a contentious case against Russia to the ICJ. See CRYER ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 223-24, 276-78.
121 See, e.g., Norman M. Feder, Reading the UN Charter Connotatively: Toward a New

Definition ofArmed Attack, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 395, 415 (1987); Christian Tams, The Use of
Force Against Terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 359, 388 (2009) (discussing the theory and noting states
showing "new willingness" to accept accumulation doctrine); Victor Kattan, The Use and Abuse of
Self-Defence in International Law: The Israel-Hezbollah Conflict as a Case Study 13-14 (June 15,
2007) (unpublished article), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-994282 (discussing the
Nadelstichtaktik(needle-prick tactic) doctrine, also known as the "accumulation of events" theory).
122 Roundtable: Causes And Effects Of The Russia-Georgia War (Radio Free Europe/Radio

Liberty radio interview, August 9, 2009), transcriptavailableat http://www.rferl.org/content/Roundtab
le -Causes And Effects Of The_ Russia GeorgiaWar/1795469.html. Edward Lucas commented that
"the basic perception now of the war in the West focuses very much on the hours before it
started and
Saakashvili's decision to send his forces north and rather ignores the two years' worth of provocations
that went before that." Id.
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before the outbreak of the 2008 war; and no major actor suggested at the time that
Georgia would be authorized, under a theory of self-defense, to repudiate the Sochi
framework and undertake the kind of attack it did on August 7th in response to the
actual level of incidents that summer or the incidents over the previous eighteen
years. So these incidents, even considered cumulatively, probably cannot excuse
Georgia's serious actions on August 7th, which in turn can excuse Russia's serious
actions on the 8th (if it meets other criteria, to which we will shortly turn). In any
case, the accumulation theory is controversial, 123 and accepting it necessarily treats
the attack on August 7th as the first act that, on its own, was undeniably serious
enough to constitute aggression and generate a right of response.
The third component of aggression is wrongfulness: the lack of legal
authority, which derives from either Security Council authorization or self-defense.
A party can use serious force, and even use it first, without committing aggression
if the force is rightly authorized. In Georgia's case, of course there is no question
of aggression: Even if it was the first to use serious and unauthorized force, Georgia
never attacked another state's territory, and states do not require Security Council
authorization or a claim of self-defense to protect their domestic order against
internal threats.124 Even the attack on the Russian peacekeepers legally based in
South Ossetia cannot be qualified as aggression. 25 As for Russia, which did attack
another state, it did not have Security Council authorization, so only self-defense
could justify Russia's actions. Can Russia's actions plausibly be called defensive?
Like Georgia, Russia had clearly prepared for war: It scheduled its Kavkaz
2008 maneuvers for July and, following their completion, maintained forces in the
area in a high state of readiness; 126 it apparently evacuated women and children
from Tskhinvali by August 4th;127 and on August 3rd, the Russian Foreign Ministry
123 Tams, supra note 121, at 370 (discussing Israel's assertion of a right to defend against
"continuous pin-prick assaults" but that this was not accepted at the Security Council; and criticizing
side-effects of accumulation doctrine, including confusion regarding temporal aspects of use of force
and requirements for immediacy); Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66

AM. J. INT'L L. 7 (1972) (discussing the Security Council's repeated rejection of this basis for selfdefense in relation to the Israeli conflict). For a current discussion, see Paul Ducheine & Eric Pouw,
Operation Change of Direction: A Short Survey of the Legal Basis and the Applicable Legal Regimes,

NETH. ANN. REv. MIL. STUD. 51-96 (2009). For two cases implicitly invoking the concept, see
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 120
(June 27); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 64 (Nov. 6) (preliminary objections).
124 Popjanevski, supra note 44, at 157 ("It is not necessary for Georgia to invoke the doctrine of
self-defense in this instance because it did not breach a sovereign border in South Ossetia.").
125 Unauthorized movement of troops stationed within a foreign state constitutes aggression, but
an attack on those troops' base by the host state does not constitute aggression, though of course it may
be wrongful in other ways. Thanks to Steve Ratner for this point.
126Some of these forces are normally based in Pskov, on the Estonian frontier, but did not return
there after the end of the Kavkaz exercises. See Malek, supra note 114 (discussing how the 58th Army,
the key force in the Russian operation in Georgia, remained in the region after the exercises ended).
127 Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russ. Fed'n, 0 telefonnom razgovore statssekretarya - zamestitelva Ministra inostrannikh del Rossii G.B. Karasina s zamestitelem
Gosudarstvennovo sekretarya S.Sh.A. Fridom [Telephone Conversation State Secretary and Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Fried] (Aug. 4, 2008),
availableat http://mid.ru/bdomp/ns-rkonfl.nsf/90be9cb5e6f07180432569e00049b5fb/432569e0003400
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warned that an "extensive military conflict" was imminent,128 a statement
consistent either with a defensive response or an intent to invade, though not with a
claim of perfidious surprise. The fact that both sides prepared for war-for attack,
counterattack, or both-could simply show that both sides accurately understood
the rising risks; after all, that is what militaries are supposed to do.
Preparations can provide the basis for a claim of anticipatory self-defense
if they are of a sufficiently threatening nature, 129 along the lines of the 1967 Six
Day War. In Georgia's case, applying the traditional Caroline test this would have
required a credible belief that Russia was preparing an imminent invasion.1 30 It is
plausible to characterize Georgia's actions in early August as anticipating an
impending Russian invasion, but equally plausible to characterize Russia's actions
as anticipating an impending Georgian attack. Again we descend into the thicket of
facts-facts whose best available interpretation favors the Russian claim or, if
things are truly ambiguous, counsels against accusations of illegality. Similarly, the
speed of Russia's response does not change its plausible factual and legal character
as a legal response rather than a first wrongful use. After all, Georgia's own
version of events requires one to believe that it counter-attacked with at least equal
speed.
If we turn to Russia's affirmative justification for its intervention, we see
that it is grounded in a right to respond to Georgia's own unjustified actions.
Although hardly a neutral player, Russia kept peacekeeping troops in South Ossetia
under arrangements agreed to by Georgia since 1992, and it had a right to defend
both them and the ceasefire lines that, on August 7th, Georgia crossed with main
force. Even though Georgia never attacked Russian territory, it did use serious
5fc325749b002bf378!OpenDocument (mentioning evacuation of women and children, but not
specifying by whom).
128 Caucasian Tragedy, supra note 42; Pavel Felgenhauer, After August 7: The Escalation of the
Russia-Georgia War, in THE GUNS OF AUGUST 2008, supra note 12, at 165 ("[T]his official Russian

position [claiming that their intervention was a spontaneous response] ignores the simple fact that an
invasion of such a magnitude would require long-term preparations involving the entire Russian
military, including the Army, Air Force, and Navy.").
129 See U.N. Charter art. 51.
The text of the U.N. Charter's Article 51 arguably limits selfdefense to situations of actual attack, but it is often accepted that some measure of anticipation is
allowed. See Steven R. Ratner, Aggression, in CRIMES OF WAR 2.0, supra note 83, at 37
(distinguishing between the more broadly accepted anticipatory defense doctrine and the Bush

administration's more expansive pre-emptive self-defense doctrine); Leo Van den Hole, Anticipatory
Self-Defense Under InternationalLaw, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 69 (2003) (arguing that it is legitimate

to expect a state to use force in anticipation of an armed attack).
130See R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 89 (1938)
(discussing how the "necessity of self-defence [is] instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation"). See generally Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8), availableat http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf
(articulating arguably narrower self-defense tests than Caroline, allowing less room for anticipation);
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
This, of course, would leave even less scope to describe Georgia's actions as anticipatory, whereas
Russia's core claim-that it was responding to an actual, ongoing invasion by Georgian forces-would
if true meet the temporal or sequential elements of any definition of aggression. See CHRISTINE D.
GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 105-08 (2008).
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force against Russian peacekeepers, killing eighteen in its initial assault; this
plausibly implicated Russia's general right to self-defense or its specific rights
under Sochi, or both.
The scope of self-defense for acts occurring beyond a state's own territory
is complex, but probably no state believes its inherent right of self-defense is coterminal with its territory: almost all states believe they have a right to defend their
interests, their populations, and their military forces abroad under defined
conditions. Inasmuch as it was responding to attacks on its citizens among the
South Ossetian population, Russia might plausibly claim self-defense directly,
relying on the so-called Entebbe defense' 31 or passive personality logic for
enforcement jurisdiction.132 These claims are more controversial,133 as is the status
of Russia's dual nationals.' 34 Still, few states accept on principle that they are
barred from acting to protect their nationals merely because they are in another
state's territory-especially if, as in this case, that other state is the source of the
threat.' 35 I am not aware that any state has ever conceded that fighting back against
an attacker who has just killed some of its own military personnel stationed abroad
constitutes aggression. So, it is plausible that, in attacking on August 8th, Russia
was responding to the Georgian assault on at least two grounds: defending its
131 See Ratner, supra note 129, at 37. Ratner stated:

A number of States have accepted that a State's first use of force to extricate its citizens from
another State when they are in imminent danger, and the other State is not able to protect
them, is not aggression (e.g. Israel's 1976 Entebbe raid) and may be a form of self-defense.
Id.
132 CRYER ET AL., supra note 2, at 223-24, 242-43 ("Passive personality jurisdiction is
jurisdiction exercised by a State over crimes committed against its nationals whilst they are abroad.").
13 See, e.g., Popjanevski, supra note 44, at 158 (citing INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND
STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT])

("[E]ndangerment of a state's citizens does not automatically create a basis for intervention militarily
on another state's territory."); GRAY, supra note 130, at 108-11 (noting other examples when this right
has been invoked- incidents in Suez, Lebanon, Congo, Dominican Republic, Iran, Grenada,
Panama-but also that the right to use force to rescue nationals in a foreign state is controversial. Some
states-for example, Belgium, Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom-have argued for this
right, but this view has not attracted many adherents). On passive personality, see CRYER ET AL., Supra
note 2, at 223-24, 42-43 ("In most instances the assertions of such jurisdiction is controversial.").
134 See 2 TAGLIAVINI REPORT, supra note 11, at 169-78 (strongly criticizing Russia's wholesale
granting of passports to South Ossetians); Kristopher Natoli, Weaponizing Nationality: An Analysis of
Russia's Passport Policy in Georgia, 28 B.U. INT'L L.J. 389 (2010) (criticizing Russia's grant of

passports to South Ossetians and its justification of the war as a defense of them, and arguing for the
illegality of Russia's actions under the abuse of rights doctrine).
135 GRAY, supra note 130, at 157 (stating that most states which have used force to rescue their
nationals, including the UK, have "expressly referred to Article 51 as covering their operations ...
[although] an alternative less satisfactory view is to seek to derive from customary international law a
right of intervention to protect nationals"); ICISS REPORT, supra note 133, at para. 4.13 ("The
Commission found in its consultations that even in states where there was the strongest opposition to
infringements on sovereignty, there was general acceptance that there must be limited exceptions to the
non-intervention rule for certain kinds of emergencies."). Whatever constraints states assert concerning
intervention to protect citizens abroad, the kinds of endangerment that occurred when Georgia attacked
on August 7th-including sustained shelling of populated areas and the killing of peacekeepers-would
likely allow a response in the eyes of most states.
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peacekeepers, and defending territory in South Ossetia for which Russia had a
defined peacekeeping responsibility. As we have already seen, Russia's claims of
Georgian aggression were in fact organized both around the harm to its
peacekeepers and civilians and the violation of its treaty-based protective rights to
be on the territory.136
Finally, it may be that Russia provoked Georgia, but it is not clear why that
matters. Russia may have wanted war, but Georgia did not have to oblige. An
enemy's actions cannot be merely metaphysically provocative. Rather, they must
meet (at least) the criteria of the Caroline test: They have to be real or threatening
in a concrete and immediate sense,' 37 which includes a measure of seriousness.
This simply returns us to the factual dispute about what happened when, and I have
yet to hear a persuasive explanation of how Russia "provoked" Georgia into
voluntarily invading South Ossetia and killing Russian troops before Russian troops
had made any overt offensive moves.138 Unless one accepts that events prior to
August 7th constituted serious actual uses of force or Carolinianthreats, singly or
cumulated, it was Georgia that initiated major combat operations by attacking
territory and persons under recognized Russian protection; once it did, it gave
Russia plausible grounds for a claim of self-defense or a right of responsive
intervention under Sochi.139

136 See South Ossetia Statement, supra note 70. The statement said:
Russia has maintained and continues to maintain a presence on Georgian territory on an
absolutely lawful basis, carrying out its peacekeeping mission in accordance with the
agreements concluded.... Georgia's acts have caused loss of life, including among Russian
peacekeepers. The situation reached the point where Georgian peacekeepers opened fire on
the Russian peacekeepers with whom they are supposed to work together to carry out their
mission of maintaining peace in this region. Civilians, women, children and old people, are
dying today in South Ossetia, and the majority of them are citizens of the Russian
Federation.

Id.
137 The Bush administration proposed a revised doctrine of preemptive self-defense, which
would relax the immediacy requirements of traditional anticipation. See THE WHITE HOUSE,

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 15-16 (2002), available at http://www.state.

gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf. But this has proved highly controversial, as it was "widely
rejected as impermissible under international law." CRYER ET AL., supra note 2, at 223-24, 269.
138 Cf May, supra note 62, at 325. May stated:
'First strike' should be seen as short-hand for 'first wronging' rather than about which State
literally engaged in physical assault first. It may seem odd to say that the State that provokes
is an aggressor, rather than the State that launches an attack. But history has shown many
examples of States that try to start wars stealthily by provoking another State to use violence
that can then be countered by supposedly self-defensive violence. Think of a state that
menacingly moves its troops to the border of another State thereby provoking that other State
to attack first.
Id. However, any such provocation must still meet the criteria for anticipatory self-defense. May
describes a doctrinal possibility; it does not mean Russia's actions actually reached to that level. Again
we return to the facts.
...Popjanevski, supra note 44, at 160. Popjanevski said:
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In sum, Georgia's actions on August 7th were a considerable escalation in
the level of activity; Georgia's resort to main force was not preceded by any
sufficiently serious event and was, therefore, the first serious use of force without
authorization. There is no question of Georgia's committing aggression because it
restricted its operations to its own territory. Still, it is not necessary to show that
Georgia committed aggression or violated Russia's territorial integrity in order to
find that Russia had the necessary authorization; Georgia used force in a way that
implicated Russia's rights as peacekeeper or its right of self-defense. Russia's first
use of serious force occurred on August 8th, plausibly in response to Georgia's
actions of the previous day; Russia's attack was serious, but it was not first, and it
was authorized as an act of self-defense of Russian forces legally stationed in South
Ossetia. However much Russia may have welcomed this development, it is not
liable for its wishes. Georgia's attack-which had all the qualities of aggression,
save that it took place on Georgia's own territory-was a gift that gave Russia the
opportunity to do what it desired.
The analysis is essentially the same for violations of territorial integrity:
Any use of force against another state technically violates its territorial integrity,
but authorized uses of force are justified. So, Russia's incursion into Georgia
violated Georgia's territorial integrity, but if Russia was responding to attacks on its
peacekeepers or defending civilian populations for which it had responsibility under
the Sochi Agreement or under a self-defense theory, its actions, even entering
undisputed Georgian territory, were not illegal, so long as they were pursuant to
those purposes. For its part, Georgia's actions may have contravened Sochi, but
they could not be characterized as territorial violations because they took place on
Georgia's own territory.
As we have seen, there is a countervailing Georgian narrative that contests
the temporal sequence or contextualizes it, 140 and based on that alternative account
one could find a claim of aggression against Russia. This view, which was mostly
accepted by U.S. officials at the time, has been contradicted by the standard
account; the point is that the Georgian narrative acknowledges the same general
contours of the law of aggression. It fills those contours with different factual
claims, but the law is the same.

Georgia's decision to advance towards Tskhinvali on August 7 likely constituted a grave
miscalculation of the possible Russian response. .. Whether or not Tbilisi perceived itself
as having no other choice but to order its troops towards Tskhinvali on August 7, its moved
provided Moscow with the pretext it needed to launch its invasion of Georgian territory.

Id.
Popjanevski, supra note 44, at 161 ("The events in early August, those on August 7 in
140
particular, should not be treated as decisive with regard to the issue of accountability in the RussiaGeorgia war.").
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Illegal Occupationand Violation of the Ceasefire

Any state that seizes the territory of another through force and exercises
effective control over it is in occupation; so, Russia occupied Georgian territory.
But as we have seen, this is not necessarily illegal. However, the ceasefire added
contractually specified actions that Russia, even as an occupier, might not otherwise
have been obliged to take. As a result, it proved a more effective vehicle for
Western condemnation than the occupation did.
Indeed, as we have seen, much Western criticism centered on alleged
Russian violations of the ceasefire agreement, such as Russia's continued operation
of some twenty-five checkpoints within Georgia. Although French and U.S.
leaders produced a highly precise formula for what the ceasefire required, the actual
six-point text was hardly clear. For example, it called for the withdrawal of Russian
forces to their prewar positions but also allowed Russia to take unspecified
"additional security measures."' 14 1 Even subsequent French clarifications appear to
indicate that Russian forces could remain in a defined zone within Georgia proper
for an indeterminate period.142 Quite simply, the text is ambiguous, and ambiguity
weighs against easy accusations of violation.
Whatever the ambiguities and complexities of the ceasefire's text, the
question of its relevance arose at the end of the August crisis. For after August
26th, on the Russian account, a sovereign South Ossetia became competent to enter
new relations (which it promptly did), rendering the ceasefire moot, at least those
parts of it pertaining to areas under South Ossetia's now-sovereign control. 143
Western states and Georgia rejected this, but that is a clash over principles of
recognition, which cannot be resolved by debating the meaning of the ceasefire or
the rules governing occupation.1 44

141

Text of the PeaceAccord, supra note 86, at point
5.

142 See id. and accompanying text, discussing the French position on the "additional security
measures."
143 One might argue that South Ossetia's independence would not
have this effect: Russia's
obligations under the ceasefire-whatever they are-constitute a binding international agreement with
Georgia and France concerning the location of Russian forces, which might remain valid even if South
Ossetia seceded. Russia did not interpret things this way, and to my knowledge no Western state raised
this claim, though presumably this is because they rejected the South Ossetia's independence outright
and considered Russia's recognition itself to be a violation of the ceasefire; they simply were not
developing arguments "in the alternative" that might acknowledge South Ossetia's independence.
Russia never contested that those parts of the ceasefire affecting Georgia proper remained valid,
although it differed with Georgia and Western states over interpretation. Over time, following initial
foot-dragging and vociferous objections from Western states, Russia withdrew from its forward
positions in Georgia proper.
144 An occupier cannot annex land or take other actions that undermine the sovereignty of the
occupied state, and recognition of a secessionist entity might contravene this rule. However, that
improperly collapses the question. If South Ossetia's secession were otherwise valid, Georgia would
no longer be sovereign, and nothing would preclude Russian recognition.
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Recognition ofBreakaway States

Russia's recognition of the two breakaway regions not only altered its
relationship to the ceasefire (as Russia saw it), but also created new grounds for
Western critique. International law strongly protects states' territorial integrity, and
probably forbids states from taking steps that even indirectly threaten the territorial
integrity or sovereignty of other states; in practice, it is very difficult for territories
or populations to secede against the wishes of the recognized government. In South
Ossetia's case, the Sochi Agreement created a process for negotiations and
confidence-building but made no promises of independence. Thus, although South
Ossetia and Abkhazia have had de facto independence since the early 1990s, no
other state had reconized them; all parties confirmed support for Georgia's
territorial integrity, 14 even as some (like Russia) discouraged Georgia from
reintegrating the territories. Under traditional doctrines of self-determination, the
separatist regions would have no claim to external self-determination-that is,
independence.146
So, at first glance, these two regions' declarations of independence and
Russia's recognition might look like violations of international law. However,
because secession is a political act, it is not in fact clear what constraints actually

145 George Khutsishvili, The Abkhazia and South Ossetia Cases: Spoilers in a Nearly Collapsed
Peace Process, in CHALLENGES TO PEACE-BUILDING: MANAGING SPOILERS DURING CONFLICT

RESOLUTION 282, 286-95 (Edward Newman & Oliver Richmond eds., 2006); Roman Muzalevsky,
War in Georgia and Its Aftermath: Russian National Security and Implicationsfor the West, 5 REV.
INT'L L. & POL. 109, 110 (2009). Muzalevsky commented:
Russia's official position since the end of the hostilities [in the 1990s] was based on its
recognition of Georgia's territorial integrity. Russia committed itself to seek an 'agreement
toward mutually acceptable model of reincarnation in [sic] common state, or towards any
other status acceptable for the parties to conflict and the custodians.' All the UN Security
Council resolutions and positions of its member states have unambiguously adhered to the
territorial integrity of Georgia.
Id. at 110.
146 Self-determination is a right of "all peoples[.]" International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 16, 1966). However, there is no clear
definition of a "people" apart from the whole population of a state or territory-a definition that
Moreover, self-determination's
tautologically excludes sub-state regions like South Ossetia.
application has traditionally been restricted to situations of colonial or alien rule. See Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (VX), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/1514(VX) (Dec. 14, 1960); Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
78-83 (July 22)
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141,
("[International law of self-determination developed in such a way as to create a right to independence
for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination
); I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 15, 712 (Robert Jennings & Arthur
and exploitation.
Watts eds., 19th ed. 1996) (noting that "the principle has often appeared in practice to be an adjunct of
the decolonialisation [sic] process rather than an autonomous principle. . . ."). On the doctrine of selfdetermination and its limited applicability outside the colonial context, see generally HURST HANNUM,
AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING
RIGHTS (1996).
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operate on states in their recognition policies.1 47 One of the classical criteria
governing recognition is the factual independence and capacity of the de facto
entity, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia had met those criteria since the early
1990s.148 States have on occasion recognized new states out of the territory of
other states, and there are few cases of a state being formally (or effectively)
sanctioned for recognizing a new state.149 Moreover, there are plausible arguments
that the right of external self-determination, though quite limited, can be invoked in
cases in which a population is denied meaningful participation in governance or is
subjected to violent repression.150
Recent events in Kosovo have further complicated any analysis of
secession and self-determination claims. In 1999, NATO intervened in Kosovo to
protect its ethnic Albanian population from ethnic cleansing by Serbia-the leading
modem example of humanitarian intervention in an internal conflict. The province
was put under U.N. administration while remaining formally a part of Serbia.
Attempts to find a mutually acceptable negotiated solution stalled; finally, in

See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 289-91
(4th ed. 1990)
("Recognition, as a public act of state, is an optional and political act and there is no legal duty in this
147

regard."); K. William Watson, When in the Course of Human Events: Kosovo s Independence and the

Law of Secession, 17 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 267-93 (2008) (discussing the political nature of
recognition).
148 See Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19
[hereinafter Montevideo Convention] ( "The state as a person of international law should possess the
following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d)
capacity to enter into relations with the other states."). See also Montevideo Convention, supra, art. 3
("The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states."). Even so, de
facto states are often not recognized; examples include Northern Cyprus, Transdniestria, Somaliland,
and of course South Ossetia and Abkhazia until 2008.
49 States have accused each other of illegal conduct in recognizing breakaway regions. For
example, Serbia condemned the recognition of Kosovo's independence by other states as a violation of
international law. As we have seen, several states objected to Russia's recognition of Ossetia and
Abkhazia. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 63d Sess., 5969th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5969 (Aug. 28, 2008). At
that meeting,
Costa Rica's representative said it was unacceptable that a United Nations Member State was
being "dismembered" by force. "We cannot, and the international community should not,
reward this approach, which is counter in all aspects to international law." A settlement of
the situation must include respect for the territorial integrity of Georgia, the rights of the
peoples of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the integrity of international law and the
principles of peaceful coexistence, as enshrined in the United Nations Charter.
Id. See also Few Countries More Condemn Russian President's Decree, APA NEWS (Aug. 26, 2008,

7:11 PM), http://en.apa.az/news/87528 (quoting officials from the United Kingdom, Sweden, France,
Germany and Ukraine, all criticizing Russia's recognition).
150 See Reference Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). The
opinion states:
A right to secession only arises under the principle of self-determination of people at
international law where 'a people' is governed as part of a colonial empire; where 'a people'
is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation; and possibly where 'a people' is
denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of which it
forms a part. In other circumstances, peoples are expected to achieve self-determination
within the framework of their existing state.

Id.
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February 2008, the United States and several major European states recognized
Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia.' 55
The United States denied that Kosovo's independence was a precedent,
citing the existence of a U.N. administration, the history of ethnic cleansing, and
other supposedly unique factors.' 5 2 Yet as an objective matter it is difficult to see
how the recognition of Kosovo didn't strengthen the case of other claimants for
statehood,' 53 especially those, like South Ossetia, that could claim a measure of
internationalization of their conflict.154 The International Court of Justice's (ICJ)
recent advisory opinion on Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence appears
to stand for the proposition that declarations of independence do not violate
international law and is entirely silent on the recognition of secessionist entities.'
Before the ICJ's opinion, it was hard to show that recognition could be illegal;
afterwards, it is no easier.
Politically, the catalytic effect of Western recognition of Kosovo was
undeniable, increasing Russia's determination and capacity to act in parallel in the

69, 74 (discussing the background of U.N.
'11 Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 146,
interaction in Kosovo and Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence); Timothy William Waters,
Misplaced Boldness: The Avoidance of Substance in the International Court of Justice's Kosovo
Opinion, 23 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. (forthcoming 2013) (summarizing the conflict and
circumstances of the independence declaration); P.D., Reactions to ICJ Kosovo Ruling: To Recognise
or Not to Recognise, ECONOMIST (July 29, 2010) http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/
2010/07/reactionsicj-kosovo-ruling.
152 See U.N. SCOR, 63d Sess., 5830th mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5839 (Feb. 18, 2008) ("My
country's recognition of Kosovo's independence is based upon the specific circumstances in which
Kosovo now finds itself. We have not, do not and will not accept the Kosovo example as a precedent
for any other conflict or dispute.")
53 See RONALD D. AsMUS, A LITTLE WAR THAT SHOOK THE WORLD: GEORGIA, RUSSIA, AND
THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 87 (2010); Oksana Antonenko, A War with No Winners, 50 SURVIVAL 23,
30ff (2008), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330802456445 (describing the effects of
Kosovo's independence on the conflict in Georgia); Solveig Righter & Uwe Halbach, A Dangerous
Precedent? The PoliticalImplication ofKosovo's Independence on Ethnic Conflicts in South-Eastern
Europe and the CIS, 20 SECURITY & HUM. RTS. 223 (2009) (discussing Kosovo's influence on the
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia); Waters, supra note 151 (critiquing the argument that
Kosovo's recognition did not create precedential effects); Kosovo Precedentfor 200 Territories,B92
(Jan. 23, 2008), http://www.b92.netieng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2008&mnm=01&dd=23&navi
d=47173 (quoting comments of Sergei Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister: "A precedent is objectively
created not just for South Ossetia and Abhazia but also for an estimated 200 territories around the
world. If someone is allowed to do something, many others will expect similar treatment."); Shaun
The Kosovo Precedent,PROSPECT (Apr. 27, 2008), http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/
Walker,
magazine/thekosovoprecedent ("[I]n recognising Kosovo, the west has admitted that there are
sometimes circumstances when a country's territorial integrity can be violated without its consent.").
154 Certainly the Sochi regime was nothing like the 1244 regime in Kosovo, which was a true
international governance project rather than just a security arrangement. But this merely shows that
Kosovo is a precedent, and the real question is how similar South Ossetia would need to be for that to
matter. Cf David Wippmann, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., Comments at the American Society for
International Law Annual Conference, Panel: Creating and Building a "State": International Law and
Kosovo (Mar. 26, 2010) (arguing that Kosovo was a precedent, but one with a very high threshold).
15 See Waters, supra note 151 (discussing the opinion and criticizing its failure to engage with
questions of secession and self-determination).
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Caucasus. 15 6 Kosovo is now widely recognized, and that suggests the international
rules-including, possibly, those pertaining to the subjects of and threshold for selfdetermination claims-have loosened.157 Russia took advantage of that to recognize
claims South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Only Nicaragua, Nauru, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and
Venezuela have joined Russia in recognizing the two states, but the small number
of recognitions itself does not suggest Russia has done anything illegal.
And, of course, hidden beneath the naked opportunism of Russia's actions
is the nature of the opportunity Georgia created on August 7th, for Russia's
decision to recognize the separatists-a step it had failed to take for over fifteen
years-came only after Georgia attempted to reassert its control over the separatists
through the most significant escalation in fighting since the initial conflict in the
early 1990s. Whatever changes may have occurred in the broader legal and
geopolitical framework, Russian recognition, coming after Georgia's attack on the
region, could plausibly be characterized as a response to a radical alteration of the
status quo by Georgia, and certainly Russia described it in those terms.
D.

DisproportionateForce and the GeographicScope of the Conflict

Before it jumped at the chance to recognize the separatists, Russia seized a
military opportunity, carrying the war Georgia had begun in South Ossetia to the
rest of Georgia's territory. Western policymakers criticized Russia's war effort as
disproportionate in its use of weaponry and tactics, but especially in its
geographical scope.

156 Will Sarkozy Plan Rubber-Stamp Georgia's Loss of Abkhazia,
South Ossetia? (Radio

Free Europe/Radio Liberty radio broadcast Aug. 13, 2008), availableat http://rferl.org/content/Sarkozy
.Plan.GeorgiaAbkhaziaOssetia/1190775.html. That commentary stated:
"Can the Ossetians and the Abkhaz - and do they want to - be a part of Georgia?" Medvedev
asked. "This question should be put to them and they will give their own, unambiguous
answer. It is not Russia or any other country that should answer this question. This should
be done in strict compliance with international law, although in recent years international law
too has abounded with examples of self-determination of peoples and the emergence of new
states on the map. Let's recall the example of Kosovo. So, it is a question that needs to be
answered by the Ossetians and the Abkhaz, taking into consideration history and what has
happened in recent days."
Id. See also Hafkin, supra note 59, at 221 ("Russia was among the fiercest objectors to the Kosovo
intervention, though nine years after that conflict it proceeded to fight in Ossetia on a somewhat similar

rationale."); David J. Smith, The Saakashvili Administration's Reaction to Russian Policies Before the
2008 War, in THE GuNs OF AUGUST 2008, supra note 12, at 127-32 (discussing the implications of

Kosovo's independence for Georgian and Russian policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia).
157 The liquefying potential of Kosovo was recognized long before the province's
independence.

See, e.g., Lorie Graham, Self-Determinationfor Indigenous Peoples After Kosovo: Translating SelfDetermination "Into Practice" and "Into Peace", 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 455, 460 (2000) ("At

the very least, the Kosovo experience calls into question any lingering claims by participating States
that the right of self-determination is limited in scope by the theoretical construct of territorial
sovereignty. More importantly, it appears to signal a change in the conceptual understanding of selfdetermination. . . .").

2013

Plucky Little Russia

219

The first part of the critique is readily dismissed: Although proportionality
places limits on the force that can be applied against an enemy, especially in the
presence of non-combatants-one may not firebomb a city to kill a sniper-no
doctrine requires an army to match its weapons to the foe's or to make the fight fair.
Russia unquestionably deployed overwhelming force, which is precisely why it
overwhelmed Georgia's smaller forces. This approach to fighting wars has a name:
It is known as the Powell Doctrine.1
Far more central to U.S. critiques was a claim that Russia's actions were
disproportionate because of their geographic scope. Russia carried the fight to
Georgia proper, systematically destroying key military installations, port facilities,
Was this
and communications infrastructure throughout the country.
disproportionate?
The U.S. claim seems problematic. Proportionality does figure as part of
the jus ad bellum, where it is used to determine the validity of a military response as
a whole in relation to the incursion that preceded it. However, it is most commonly
59
deployed as part of thejus in bello to analyze discrete attacks,' precisely because
it is difficult to evaluate proportionality ad bellum. Given the uncertainty inherent
in defining any war's aims, measuring the proportionality ad bellum-really in
media belli in the Georgian War, given how quickly Western leaders reacted-of a
given use of force is difficult, and the margin of discretion considerable.'so
Specifically, while the right of self-defense is limited to proportional
means, this is really just a corollary of seriousness analysis, which defines an

158 Robert Haddick, This Week at War: The Long Death of the Powell Doctrine, FOREIGN POL'Y

(Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/03/05/this-weekat-warthe_powell-doctr
ineis dead (noting that one element of the strategy is that any "military plan should employ decisive
and overwhelming force in order to achieve a rapid result"). There is little evidence that Russia used
exotic, prohibited weaponry; it simply used a great deal of the conventional sort.
59 See LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 117-19 (2008) (discussing jus
ad bellum and jus in bello proportionality principles, and noting that the former is principally oriented
toward measuring whether the losses caused by a war outweigh the gains). On the differences, and
overlap, between theater and incident proportionality, see Final Report to the Prosecutor by the
Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, ICTY Doc. PR/P.I.S./510-E, 39 I.L.M. 1257 (June 13, 2000), availableat http://www.icty.
org/sid/10052. That report states:
[A] determination that inadequate efforts have been made to distinguish between military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects should not necessarily focus exclusively on a
specific incident. If precautionary measures have worked adequately in a very high
percentage of cases then the fact they have not worked well in a small number of cases does
not necessarily mean they are generally inadequate.
Id. at 29.
160 Timothy William Waters, Unexploded Bomb: Voice, Silence, and Consequence at the Hague
Tribunals: A Legal and Rhetorical Critique, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1015 (2003) (discussing

findings by the Prosecution of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia finding
that NATO's Kosovo campaign had not been disproportionate at the tactical or theater level and
showing that the Prosecution itself argued that applying proportionality, especially at the theater level,
is very difficult).
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acceptable range of responses.161 An otherwise authorized defender is not required
to stop at the initial incursion line or leave an attacker's military capacity intact.
Proportionality and necessity can limit the proper geographic scope of a military
response,162 and states do sometimes limit their operations, but this has never been
read to imply a constraint on otherwise militarily valid campaigns reaching the
whole national territory of the combatant states themselves. 1 More broadly, a
right of necessary and proportional self-defense implies a right to defend oneself
effectively, which can reach Napoleonic levels. Canonical examples include the
United States' prosecution of the war against Japan well beyond the Hawaiian
Islands and the Philippines, including its systemic bombing and planned invasion of
the Home Islands, or the debellation of the Third Reich. More recent examples
include the Gulf War, in which operations against Iraq were not limited to Kuwaiti
territory or even the immediately adjacent parts of Iraq, or the removal of the
Taliban following Al-Qaeda's 9-11 attacks, undertaken under NATO's Article 5
self-defense provision.164 These examples suggest that, once a defensive right is
triggered, combatants have considerable discretion to pursue the logic of military
advantage, with all that implies about taking the fight to enemy forces,1 6 5 and that
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 77 (Nov. 6) (preliminary objections) (finding
40-44
U.S. action disproportionate to original attack); Legality of the Threat, supra note 130,
(discussing proportionality in the context of nuclear weapons); MAY, supra note 159, at 126-29
(discussing a "specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only measures which are proportional
to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary international
161

law"); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Preserving the Peace: The Continuing Ban on War Between States, 38

CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 41, 52-54 (2007) (arguing that a U.S. attack on Iran aimed at stopping its nuclear
program or its aid to Hezbollah would violate principles of necessity and proportionality because it
would likely not succeed in accomplishing its military objective).
162 In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, the ICJ rejected Uganda's claim of selfdefense and found that Uganda had violated Congo's territorial integrity and sovereignty, with
sufficient gravity to constitute a violation of Charter Article 2's prohibition on use of force. While not
reaching the question directly, it suggested that Uganda's operations inside Congo might have been
disproportionate, but these were hundreds of kilometers from the frontier where, Uganda alleged,
transborder incursions by irregular forces had occurred, which the court was not satisfied could be
attributed to Congo in any case. These facts are difficult in all particulars from the events of August
2008. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
2005 I.C.J. 168, 1146-65 (Dec. 19).
163
Compare Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between Jus ad Bellum and lus in Bello, 9
REV. INT'L STUD. 221, 223 (1983) ("The traditional assumption that the outbreak of war between two

states necessarily involved hostilities ... wherever they might meet . .. can no longer be regarded as
valid."), with Christopher J. Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in THE
HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 51 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995) ("The area of
war comprises[] the territories of the parties to the conflict as defined by the national boundaries . . . .").
See generally DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 20-24 (noting only exceptions based on formal neutralization

arrangements because "[i]n principle, all the territories of the belligerent States, anywhere under their
sovereign sway, are inside the region of war").
164 See Press Release, N. Atl. Treaty Org., Invocation of Article 5 Confirmed (Oct. 2, 2001),
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm.
165 Cf DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 237-38 ("Once war is raging, the exercise of self-defense may
bring about the destruction of the enemy's army regardless of the condition of proportionality. . . . The
scale of counterforce used by the victim State in a war of self-defense will be far in excess of the
magnitude of the original force employed in an armed attack 'short of war', and the devastation caused
by the war will surpass the destructive effects of the initial use of unlawful force.").
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of actions taken in self-defense includes a vast margin of
objective evaluation
166
appreciation.
On the facts in the Georgian war, the claim of disproportion is even more
tenuous. States do often limit the geographic scope of their operations, but Russia's
incursions, including ones specifically criticized as disproportionate, actually did
not go far beyond the disputed territory. Gori, the Georgian operation's principal
67
Poti is further, but is also the
base, is only a few miles from South Ossetia.'
principal port, a classic military objective. Abkhazia was less plausibly related to
strategic protection of Ossetia, but as we have seen, nothing in the laws of war
limits a defender to the original territory, and operations there would fit
comfortably in the broad discretion typically afforded to a defender to neutralize a
military threat. And Georgia is simply not that large of a country: The muchdiscussed drive towards Tbilisi stopped halfway to the capital, about twenty-five
miles from the Ossetian boundary.
Finally, we might contrast the smallness of Georgia with the size of
Georgia's attack, and what that implies about Russia's authorization. Self-defense
must be proportional to the real or anticipated harm, so if the harm or the
operational scope required to neutralize it is great enough, the right of self-defense
is commensurately expansive. The Georgian operations on August 7th were hardly
the bombing of Pearl Harbor or the breaching of the Polish frontier, but they were
significant military operations involving the mobilization of military resources and
infrastructure across much of Georgia, leading to significant loss of life and
Georgia's brief recapture of Tskhinvali and sizable parts of South Ossetia., if
those operations gave Russia a responsive right to use force, it stretches credulity to
suppose that right did not reach to the broader territory beyond the zone of
peacekeeping operations-that is, to Georgia proper, and as much of it as
necessary.
But apart from the weakness of its specific critique, what is of interest is
how U.S. claims that Russia's actions were geographically disproportionate
conflated the two halves of the laws of war. Criticisms of Russia's insertion of
166 We might recall as well another recent war, whose aftermath was tangentially relevant to the
recognition crisis following the Georgian War: NATO's Kosovo bombing campaign, which was not
limited to the area in which ethnic cleansing was occurring but in fact targeted sites all across Serbia.
In that war, NATO did not invoke self-defense, but the rationale of fighting wherever military necessity
requires was the same.
167 The Georgian forces that attacked on August 7th began their operations from bases in Gori,
received their supplies from Georgia proper, and were commanded from Tbilisi.
68 It is interesting to consider if Russia's authorization would have been more limited had
Georgia not killed Russian peacekeepers. Logically, the contingency of the harm-a shell landing wide
or hitting the mark-shouldn't govern the outcome, but practically, levels of harm serve as at least a
rough proxy for seriousness. This means that if Georgia hadn't killed peacekeepers, or hadn't launched
a major assault to retake territory but only a small incursion, Russia's claim would have been
commensurately weaker. On the actual facts, though, it is doubtful if the loss of life was decisive,
because the territorial aspects of Georgia's attack were, by themselves, clearly serious enough. Selfdefense may require some tangible acts by the enemy, but a defending state is not required to wait for
human losses to repel an invader.
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forces into 'Georgia proper' as disproportionate conflated territorial integrity with
the jus in bello norms of proportionate response -saying, in effect, that given the
origins of the conflict in South Ossetia, any Russian response should have been
contained to that area, and any extension of the war into Georgia proper was ipso
facto disproportionate. Nothing in the laws of war supports this.
Indeed, what the West condemned as disproportionate force is difficult to
distinguish from the very act of attacking Georgia proper as such, even though
logically these are different things. 170 The effect of the United States' interpretation
is to conflate disproportionality with aggression. In a sense, of course, all acts
pursuant to aggression are disproportionate by definition, but the symmetric
property does not apply to the reverse equation.
Much as we have seen with the other categories, the proportionality of
Georgia's actions was not discussed in the same terms as was Russia's, and indeed
was not at issue in the same way. Although Georgia was criticized for
disproportionate acts of the in bello variety, it was not criticized for any ad bellum
violations-how could it, after all, since it was attacking its own territory?
So, did Russia act illegally? U.S. policymakers uniformly proclaimed it
had, but the legal standards do not easily support such a confident assertion. Some
discrete acts were unquestionably illegal, and even if carried out by Ossetian
irregulars, Russia could be responsible.' 7 1 But these were not the things U.S.
policymakers focused on: Their public anger was reserved for Russia's decision to
fight at all and to carry the war into Georgia proper; on those points, the balance of
international law favors Russia. Georgia struck first without cause or authorization,
greatly increasing the levels of violence rather than continuing negotiations, and in
the legal analysis, that matters decisively. Most of Russia's actions were consistent
with an assertive-and very effective-response within the framework established
at Sochi. At least, that is a plausible account of events measured against the legal

69 Wood, supra note 55 (quoting Deputy Secretary
of State John D. Negroponte as saying "that
we deplore today's Russian attacks by strategic bombers and missiles.... These attacks mark a
dangerous and disproportionate escalation of tensions, as they occur across Georgia in regions far from
the zone of conflict in South Ossetia.").
170Popjanevski, supra note 44, at 158. Another argument holds that Russia acted wrongly by
causing more loss of life than the original alleged harm by Georgia. "Russia's excessive use of force
across the entire territory of Georgia, which resulted in casualties well exceeding the number of deaths
during the initial fighting and caused severe material destruction, thus discredits Russia's justification
for its intervention." Cf May, supra note 62, at 321, 327 (arguing that states should decline to
intervene if it would result in larger loss of life.) Though morally appealing, this argument makes it
hard to explain most accepted exercises of self-defense, including Allied conduct in World War II.
Most wars lead to more deaths than their triggering events.
17 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 26-27. Russia likely violated international law
by allowing Ossetian irregulars to loot, rape, and expel Georgians; to the degree such acts constitute
ethnic cleansing, this is a serious charge. Under the law of occupation, Russia is responsible for
maintaining law and order in the areas its forces control. However, even clear violations would not
necessarily invalidate the initial resort to force or the decision to strike Georgia proper.
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categories: If there is anything problematic here, it lies less in the factual details
than in the law.
Still, it is a curious outcome: a war without anyone to blame, at least in
law, for starting it. Though Russia was not an aggressor, neither was Georgia, since
its operations, although widely described as reckless, took place on its own soil.
Georgia could not violate its own sovereignty or territorial integrity, or illegally
occupy itself. The de facto South Ossetian regime, in turn, could not commit many
of these acts either, because it was still a recognized part of Georgia: South
Ossetians could no more commit aggression against their own state than their own
state could against them. Even so, there was what any sensible person would call a
war, and that suggests a problem.
Even if it does not regulate internal conflicts in precisely the same way it
does international ones, a properly conceived law of aggression should be able to
say something intelligent and consequential about internal conflicts as well. And
this implies, in the present case, asking some very critical questions about Georgia.
For who actually upset the legal and normative order in the Caucasus that August?
The West condemned Russia for using the archaic tools of twentieth-century power,
but really, isn't that also what Georgia did when it rolled out its tanks? It would be
a mistake to blame giant Russia for the war just because it carried the fight to its
enemy and won. It would be a mistake to confuse the location of the battlefield
with the question of what was being fought over and by whom. Asking what
Russian tanks were doing on the other side of the international frontier obscures the
equally critical question of what Georgian tanks were doing on their own side-and
why it is their side.
IV. WAITING FOR A MECHANISM (WHICH WE ALREADY HAVE):
INTERNATIONALIZING TERRITORIALITY ININTERNAL CONFLICTS
One might expect massed armor crossing an international frontier to
constitute the paradigmatic example of aggression-a case perfectly fit to analyze
with the jus ad bellum-and in the first flush and shock of war, this is exactly how
Western leaders described Russia's actions. Yet that August, a constellation of
circumstances combined to produce an anomalous outcome: an undeniably
international war, but without any aggressor or any wrongful violation of territorial
integrity. In theory, this is not supposed to happen.
As we have seen, the modem U.N. Charter regime prescribes a limited
universe of violence: A use of force is either authorized by the Security Council or
undertaken in self-defense, otherwise it violates the Charter. The sequential, causal
relationship between aggression and self-defense suggests that it should not be
possible for all actors in a war to have a legitimate right to use force.172 The just
172

See Self-Defense: Discussion, 81 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 350, 351 (1987) (quoting Oscar

Schachter, who said: "Self-defense is a justifiable use of force in response to a prior illegitimate use of
force. Hence it would not be possible for each of the two states in conflict to legitimate use [sic] of
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war tradition-with which this Article is not directly concerned, but which
underpins discussions of aggressionin-likewise does not readily contemplate the
idea of universally just war, in which all parties have a justification to fight.17 4 It is
possible that no party to a conflict is justified or legally authorized in using force,
but hardly that all are.
It is completely obvious that Georgia did not violate the classical jus ad
bellum for the simple reason that its forces fought entirely on its own territory
where, traditionally, the resort to force was almost completely unregulated. It is
equally obvious that Russia's forces-those that were not peacekeepers-crossed
an international frontier. That obvious fact combined with the obvious preferences
of Georgia's allies to yield the claims and charges we saw in Part II: aggression,
violations of territorial integrity, occupation and ad bellum disproportionality. But,
as we saw in Part III, those claims do not actually work; although the United States
and its allies issued vociferous criticisms, the better reading is that Russia had legal
justification for its decision to use force and for the broad outlines of its campaign,
and that any violations were of thejus in bello kind.
This puts the puzzle before us: How can all parties in a conflict be
justified? On this, the doctrine is unimpeachable: Logically-tautologically-they
cannot. To resolve this, we must see that the reasons why Russia was not in
violation of the jus ad bellum also point to the reasons why Georgia was. And the
thing we will find specifically problematic in Georgia's actions shows us there are
force in self-defense."). Naturally, each party may believe itself to be acting in self-defense, but the
notionally objective standard for determining the status of a conflict does not readily acknowledge
parties' subjective views, which would obviously open the doctrine up to self-dealing. See Luisa

Vierucci, 'Special Agreements' Between Conflicting Parties in the Case-law of the ICTY, in THE
LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 401, 426 (Bert
Swart et al. eds., 2011). Vierucci stated:

[S]ince the conclusion of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 it became clear that, under
international law, the determination of the nature of an armed conflict is based on a defacto
standard (i.e., the mere existence of an armed conflict) and not on the intention of the parties

to make war (animus bellandi). As is well known, the defacto standard was adopted in order

to evade the political manipulations to which the determination of the nature of a conflict
would be subjected if left to the evaluation of the parties to the conflict.
This is true even if the parties themselves agree on how to characterize the conflict. See Prosecutor v.
Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, 583 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia May 7,
1997) (agreement between the parties to the conflict in Bosnia "does not in any way affect
the
independent determination of the nature of that conflict by this Trial Chamber").
173 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Legitimating
HumanitarianIntervention: Principles and Procedures,
2
MELBOURNE J. INT'L L. 550, 554-60 (2001); George Weigel, Just War Traditionand the World After
September 11, 51 CATH. U. L. REv. 707 (2002) (discussing criteria of just war theory and when they
might be realized and observing "'defense against aggression' has become
the primary, even sole,
meaning of 'just cause').
174 Cf CORNELIU BJOLA, LEGITIMISING THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:
Kosovo, IRAQ AND THE ETHICS OF INTERVENTION 27 (2009). Bjola stated:
Drawing on arguments put forward by Augustine, Aquinas, and Vitoria, some just war
theories argue that war should be waged only to correct and/orpunish an injustice that has
already occurred. Others, though, go even further and claim that the prevention of an
injustice that is about to happen also constitutes a just cause for war.
Id. Correction and prevention leave little scope for mutual justification.
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compelling grounds to rethink the general legal categories we have: to reconceive
what we mean by sovereign territory, and-perhaps-discern the outlines of a
different model for humanitarian intervention.
A.

Layered Territoriality:Sochi as a Special Constrainton
Georgia'sSovereignty

As we have seen, Russia's justifications for using force principally arise
from its legitimate role and presence in South Ossetia. Asking why Russia was
allowed to exercise rights in South Ossetia is roughly equivalent to asking why an
otherwise sovereign Georgia was not allowed to exercise its rights. At one level,
there is a purely positivist answer: In 1992, Russia and Georgia signed an
agreement providing for Russia to operate on Georgian soil, and limiting Georgia's
rights in the same area. But the Sochi Agreement was not simply a typical
specification of rights and obligations, such as one might find in a trade treaty or
even in a status of forces agreement for basing troops abroad; it was a deeply
intrusive, open-ended reorganization of Georgia's internal governance, made in
response to an internationalized war at whose root was an internal conflict over
Sochi incorporated certain general international rules, like selfsovereignty.
defense norms and prohibitions on the use of force, into an internal conflict.
Georgia was barred from unilaterally deploying force on part of its own territoryfrom resolving its own internal conflict-without risking a legally legitimated
Russian reaction. The French peace plan from August 2008 speaks of additional
security measures "while awaiting an international mechanism.' 1 76 But of course,
there already was one: Functionally, the Sochi Agreement is an internationalized
mechanism for regulating an internal conflict.
Once we adopt this view, the performance of the various actors in August
2008 looks rather different. Rather than aggressors, Russian tanks are a responsive
mechanism designed to stop Georgian incursions in violation of the Sochi regimea mechanism, moreover, that actually worked as it was supposed to. This is
apparent if one accepts the standard account of the events that August, but even if
one has doubts about the particular factual sequence, a hypothetical question makes
the point: Under the Sochi regime, what would one have expected Russia to do if
Georgia had suddenly tried to reconquer South Ossetia?

17 Cf Vicken Cheterian, The August 2008 War in Georgia: From Ethnic Conflict to Border
Wars, 28 CENT. ASIAN SURv. 155, 156 (2009), availableat http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02634930903056

768 ("The August 2008 war moved the conflicts in the Caucasus from ethnic conflicts powered by
mass nationalist mobilization, to conflicts between centralized state structures around borders and
territorial control."). Cheterian writes to another purpose, but the observation about the shift in the
conflict's relationship to territory captures the same point.
176 Text of the Peace Accord, supra note 86. The French original reads: "Dans l'attente d'un
mcanisme international. . . ." The New York Times provided the English translation. Parentheticals
are handwritten additions to the original French document.
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Calling the events of August 2008 an act of international regulation is an
interesting way to think about the war, and also the answer to our original puzzle:
Georgia violated no rules of general international law, but it did violate a lex
specialis regime incorporating some of those rules into what would otherwise have
been a purely internal affair, which gave Russia responsive rights to enforce the
regime's terms with military force. The singular feature of Sochi was its
reconceptualization of Georgia's territory: Under its internationalized regime,
Georgia did not have the right to move its military forces into or otherwise exercise
almost any effects of its sovereignty over contested parts of its own territory. Sochi
effectively created a layered territoriality within Georgia, with rights pertaining to
other states like Russia and other actors, including South Ossetia and the OSCE.
A BBC interview with Russia's Foreign Minister early in the war gives a
sense of these two moves-the creation of responsive rights and the reorganization
of sovereign Georgian territory. His particular interpretation is obviously highly
partisan and preferential, but makes the general point about the mechanism Sochi
plausibly put in place:
S.Lavrov: ... this peacekeeping force has a mandate. The mandate is to
make sure that there is no violation of quiet in the zone of conflict and the
peacekeepers are required by this document to prevent any violations and
to put out any violations. Since Georgian forces for the second time are
engaged in aggressive actions in full violation of the obligations under
those international agreements and international humanitarian law [listing
various alleged violations]. So this is absolutely unacceptable and the
responsibility of Russia as a peacekeeper could be only sustained by
responding to this aggression.
Question: Does not Georgia then have the right to control its entire
territory?
S.Lavrov: Absolutely. Absolutely, but Georgia after it attacked, as I said,
its own regions in the early nineties, accepted that there would be
international mechanisms to keep peace in Ossetia and in Abkhazia but not
to perpetuate the situation. In both cases international negotiating
mechanism [sic] has been established with the participation of
Georgia ... m
If we analyze Sochi as a specifically territorialconstraint, we arrive at an
interpretation that plausibly places Georgia in violation of a specialized norm of
territorial integrity-a violation of something that is, or looks very much like, the
177 Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra
note 93. Lavrov's partisan interpretation is
heavily focused on events in the 1990s: He bases Russia's legal claim for acting in 2008 on Georgian
violations in light of Sochi. Also, within a few weeks, as we have seen, Russia would no longer
reflexively acknowledge Georgia's territorial sovereignty.
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jus ad bellum. This initiates the doctrinal sequence of action and response,
returning us to the position in which the anomaly of universally legal war is erased:
Neither side violated the general norms of the jus ad bellum, but Georgia violated
specific obligations that we can and should assimilate to general norms on territorial
integrity, and from this all the actors' uses of force can be understood.
B.

From Lex Specialis to a General Rule: Internationalizing
Internal Conflicts

Accepting this view of territoriality solves our original puzzle: it identifies
a violation of territorial integrity norms sufficient to show that one party was not
authorized to use force and that another was. The purpose of this exercise has not
been not to achieve doctrinal purity, however; on the contrary, it is to drag doctrine
towards relevance. For it is precisely the rigidity of thejus ad bellum that makes it
difficult to see Georgia as the violating party: Under general international law, it
was and is by definition impossible for Georgia to aggress against itself or violate
its own territorial integrity, and it is only because of the Sochi regime that we can
reach such a conclusion.
The present contours of the jus ad bellum remain dogmatically hostile to
the regulation of states' internal resort to force as such. There is simply no
prohibition in international law on a state using force within its own territory to
So, moving beyond a special, contingent interpretation
suppress insurrections.
applicable only in defined circumstances (as the Sochi Agreement was) to a more
generally applicable interpretation would imply a considerable expansion of the
conceptual commitments underlying the rules on territorial integrity. And such an
expansion would also move international law towards more substantive engagement
with the nature of internal conflicts, which are often fought precisely over questions
of sovereignty and self-determination.
Internal conflicts are not unregulated; on the contrary, they are subject to
extensive protections and prohibitions in international criminal and humanitarian
law. Under the influence of human rights and a re-emergent international criminal
law, the law of armed conflict has undergone a dramatic deformalization that has
relaxed its doctrinal dualism: many of the same rules now apply to both
international and non-international armed conflicts; the requirement of a nexus to
armed conflict for crimes against humanity has been eliminated; and an expanding
1
The Tagliavini Report tries to do this, applying the existing jus ad bellum to the actions of
both Georgia and South Ossetia on the grounds that South Ossetia is a de facto state, but this has been
greeted as an unpersuasive misreading of the lex lata. See supra note 11; see also Christian Henderson

& James A. Green, The Jus Ad Bellum and Entities Short of Statehood in the Report on the Conflict

in Georgia, 59 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 129 (2010), available at http://joumals.cambridge.org/action/displ
ayFulltext?type=6&fid=7100896&jid=ILQ&volumeld=59&issueld= 01&aid=7100892&bodyld=&me
mbershipNumber-&societyETOCSession=&fulltextType=RA&fileld=S0020589309990108
(criticizing the report's arguments about use of force variously as "flimsy," "illogical," and "casual and
cursory," and criticizing the report's conclusions as desirable lexferenda, not lex lata).

228

STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

49:1

menu of crimes against humanity track more closely with human rights law. 179 The
mere occurrence of human rights violations or significant crimes is, doctrinally and
even politically, sufficient to bring an internal conflict onto the international plane,
a move that increasingly correlates with the arrival of internationalized military
forces.
Most notably, there has been a considerable expansion of support for
doctrines of humanitarian intervention, 8s especially the responsibility to protect
(known by its regrettable acronym R2P), 1 applied in the recent authorizations of
force against Libya and Ivory Coast. 18 2 Although existing forms of humanitarian
intervention like R2P do not formally address jus ad bellum norms, they
increasingly describe limitations on states' scope of action in the jus in bello that, if
sufficiently expanded, could effectively deny a sovereign the ability to go to war
against its own people.
However, the practical and conceptual reach of these initiatives into the jus
ad bellum are still quite limited.' 83 They have not extended the definitional scope
of aggression-which remains fully, formalistically limited to the international
179 See especially Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72,
Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995)
(confirming the application of significant portions of the law governing international armed conflict to
purely internal conflicts and decline of nexus to armed conflict for crimes against humanity). See also
CRYER ET AL., supra note 2, at 229-32 (discussing the gradual expansion of the principles applicable in
international armed conflicts to internal armed conflicts); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 28
("Customary humanitarian law as it relates to the fundamental principles concerning conduct of
hostilities is now recognized as largely the same whether it is applied to an international or a non-

international armed conflict."); STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 105-07

(2009) (discussing tensions between doctrinal coverage of crimes in internal and international
conflicts).
18o MAY, supra note 159, at 273-96; OSCAR SOLERA, DEFINING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
444-63 (2007); John Langan, The Element ofSt. Augustine's Just War Theory, 12 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS

19 (1984). Although it has clear roots in Catholic just war theory (especially the third category of
acceptable wars, or liberation of an oppressed people), the locus classicus of modern humanitarian
intervention is NATO's 1999 Kosovo war.
''
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) developed the
principle. ICISS REPORT, supra note 133 (applying the responsibility to protect); G.A. Res. 63/308,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/308 (Oct. 7, 2009) (deciding to continue consideration of the responsibility to
protect); World Summit Final Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1,
138-39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16,
2005); S.C. Res. 167, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).
82 S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) ("Reiterating the
responsibility of the
Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear
the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians . . . ."); S.C. Res.
1975, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1975 (Mar. 30, 2011) ("The Security Council [r]ecallsits authorization and
stresses its full support given to the [United Nations Operation in C6te d'Ivoire], while impartially
implementing its mandate, to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians
under imminent threat of physical violence . . . ."); see also Jayshree Bajoria, Libya and the
Responsibility to Protect, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/libya/libya-

responsibility-protect/p24480.
183 The form of responsibility to protect adopted by the U.N. reiterates the primacy of the
Security Council, rather than affirming a pathway for independent action by willing states, as happened
in the Kosovo intervention.
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plane 1 84 -and only imperfectly reach the most critical part of internal conflicts,
namely challenges to the very existence of the state's sovereignty authority. This
suggests that the Georgian War-whose internationalized mechanism for regulating
a persistent challenge to a state's sovereign order clearly touches these issues-has
something to tell us about an alternative path towards more robust restrictions on
internal sovereign violence.' 85
What would a functional jus ad bellum for internal conflicts look like more
generally-abstracted, that is, from the circumstances of Sochi? An explication is
far beyond the scope of this Article, but it is worth noting a few issues-the
enormous questions that would have to be resolved-in defining the parameters
such a model of 'protectable territory' might take.186 A Sochi-style model would
import the norms of the jus ad bellum to internal conflicts, by identifying territorial
lines with a functional status equal to an international frontier in relation to the use
of force-territory whose violation would allow the kinds of responses that are
automatically available in true international conflicts. This would create, within a
single state, differentiated sovereignties derived directly from the territorial aspects
of conflict.
A Sochi model would rely on some kind of tripwire forces to secure this
'protectable territory.' The force would be authorized to respond to any incursions
184 Ironically, R2P and all current forms of humanitarian intervention generally are vulnerable to
challenge precisely on the grounds that they constitute a form of illegal aggression-a view Russia has
advanced. Cf U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3988th mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988 (Mar. 24,
1999), availableat http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF
6E4FF96FF9%7D/kos%20SPV3988.pdf. At that meeting, Sergei Lavrov spoke on behalf of Russia:
Attempts to justify the NATO strikes with arguments about preventing a humanitarian
catastrophe in Kosovo are completely untenable. Not only are these attempts in no way
based on the Charter or other generally recognized rules of international law, but the
unilateral use of force will lead precisely to a situation with truly devastating humanitarian
consequences. Moreover, by the terms of the definition of aggression adopted by the
General Assembly in 1974, "No consideration of whatever nature, whether political,
economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression".
Id.
1
R2P and humanitarian intervention were not invoked in any significant way during the
Georgian War: Georgia and its allies would have had no use for the doctrine (since Georgia never
crossed a frontier and its allies could have intervened, had they chosen to, by Georgian invitation),
while Russia-which in theory could have used it to justify its cross-border intervention-is not
particularly partial to the doctrine, given its provenance in the Kosovo conflict. See SECURITY

COUNCIL REPORT, UPDATE REPORT NO. 4: PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT 1 (2006),

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/
Update%20Report%2013%20January%202006_POC.pdf ("China and Russia, specifically, believe that
reference to responsibility to protect by the Security Council is premature . . . . Also, the principles of
sovereignty and territorial integrity have led them to fear that rapid interventions in exercise of the
responsibility to protect could occur.").
186 Cf Henderson & Green, supra note 178 (criticizing the Tagliavini Report's attempt to assert
jus ad bellum rules for internal conflict and arguing that "applying [such] rules to these entities would
mean a large conceptual and practical shift in the legal regime of thejus ad bellum. Any such process
would need careful consideration; the ramifications could be great. The system as it stands is not able
coherently to cope with the applicability of the core provisions of thejus ad bellum to non-State
entities").
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across those quasi-frontiers by military personnel and perhaps other agents of the
state.187 Once triggered, any response would be subject to the norms of the jus in
bello, and therefore have to be proportional to the harm and appropriate in nature.
So, for example, the establishment of a post office in contravention of a special
agreement would not justify a military assault, but might allow the forces to
physically shut down the operation. Ideally, conflicts would be governed by the
full range of international protections, rather than the less comprehensive rules
governing non-international conflicts (though as we have seen, these are
converging).
Some of the forces' operational authority would be specified in a special
agreement (indeed it would be necessary to do this, to avoid the uncertainty that
leads to escalating disputes of the kind that always arise on what would be, in
effect, a militarized frontier), but the most important aspects-such as self-defense
norms-might simply be imported from general international law; it is these aspects
that would create the tripwire.
Indeed, it might be better not to specify all the conditions under which
force could be used. The lack of provisions in Sochi specifying the parties' powers
to act in event of a breach by another party actually suggests the potential of this
model: International law's voluntarism has always allowed states to contract their
way into complex relationships. But here the law's background provisions were
imported even without specification, and were probably more robust because of
that: In 1992, had the parties engaged in arms-length negotiations to agree on
specific language governing breaches of the agreement and rights of intervention, it
is likely those norms would have been relatively restrictive, making the mechanism,
when it came to be used twenty years later, much less effective. On the other hand,
unspecific norms would give the 'protecting' state more leeway to intervene
opportunistically, in just the way Russia has been plausibly accused of doing. 188
How would these forces be created and authorized? Sochi was the product
of an international agreement, and initially, at least, it is difficult to see any other
way to it. Over time, the model might become generalized-at least, it would
clearly be desirable that it be increasingly available as an obvious option or default
model that would be hard to avoid, much in the way international criminal tribunals
have become a default response to major episodes of internationalized internal
conflict. Such a default would put (marginally more) pressure on states involved in
internal conflicts to accept intervention. But how this would happen-how exactly
mechanisms derived through lex specialiswould affect general or customary law on
18 The tripwire force principally acts to constrain the sovereign, but there is no reason it could

not also constrain the separate forces. Indeed, the Sochi model clearly did this, discouraging Georgia
from intervening and the separatists from perfecting their claim. As we have seen, Russia, despite its
obvious biases, also operated as a constraint on the separatist Ossetians, and Georgia regularly dealt
with it in this capacity, whatever its private opinion about the Russian side's sincerity or neutrality.
Henderson & Green, supra note 178, at 137 ("Any such precedent would be extremely
damaging to international peace and security. States could forcibly aid any entity that requested help;
the scope for the (increased) abuse of the right of self-defence would be huge.").
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the jus ad bellum and move from special agreement to general norm-is anything
but clear.
As for the likely application of such a model: A typology of internal
conflicts and the tools to address them is well beyond the scope of this Article-it
might well be one direction this argument suggests for further research-but it is
worth noting the ways in which the Sochi Agreement represents a model that moves
farther than others towards a functional ban on internal aggression. Unlike existing
R2P models, all of which contemplate high levels of human suffering before
intervention can be undertaken,' 8 the Sochi regime gave Russia the right to use
necessary and proportionate means to counter whatever level of incursion Georgia
undertook within a defined, protected territory.1 90 Its capacity to respond was not
limited to serious interventions: A single Georgian soldier crossing into the special
zone, or indeed any improper deployment of Georgian sovereignty, would have
authorized Russia to respond-subject to limits of proportionality-without delay
or deliberation.
And Russia would have been authorized to act without delay or
deliberation, because the Sochi regime created a standing, pre-existing trigger
mechanism. R2P models are post hoc and reactive threshold-response models and
require either a vote by the Security Council or a long process of deliberation. 191
Sochi required neither a threshold of harm nor reactive authorization; when the
regime's territory was breached or its peacekeepers attacked, Russia was already
licensed to act. It was this tripwire that allowed the mechanism to react so quickly
and effectively. 192 These features look much more like the automatic, inherent right
of self-defense in thejus ad bellum.
The Sochi Agreement did not expressly create these rights for Russia: It
did not authorize any autonomous right of military response, nor did it specify any
conditions under which Russian forces may cross into Georgia proper. But Sochi
implicitly, necessarily incorporated a range of general legal norms such as self189 ICISS REPORT, supra note 133 (referring to levels of harm or violations that might trigger
intervention); U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for All, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) (referring to intervention triggers); High-Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N.
Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) (also referring to intervention triggers).
190 One can object that, in fact, over the past two decades the Sochi regime has tolerated an
unacceptably high level of violence, including the numerous incidents that on a cumulative theory of
self-defense could justify Georgia's actions in August 2008.
191 The main R2P models also emphasize preventative work and post-conflict rebuilding. See
138-40;
ICISS REPORT, supra note 133 at 29, 39; World Summit Final Outcome, supra note 181,
Sean Murphy, Criminalizing HumanitarianIntervention, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 341, 353-54
(2009) (discussing the complications arising from the post hoc nature of humanitarian intervention).
However, it seems clear that the core of all these models is the justification for military intervention,
and on that score, they all adopt a threshold-of-harm approach.
192 A perfectly functioning mechanism would have provided greater signaling and specific
deterrence such that Georgia would not even have undertaken its adventure. The Sochi mechanism also
provided no means of moving beyond enforcement of the frozen conflict to a permanent resolution.
See Sochi Agreement, supra note 23.
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defense. Once that self-defense logic was engaged, it operated not according to the
minimal, poorly drafted norms of Sochi, but by the more categorical logic of thejus
ad bellum.

Most important, a mechanism like Sochi may be especially apposite for
internal conflicts that involve self-determination claims, precisely because the
mechanism territorializes the sovereign's relationship to the internal dispute. It is
common to call South Ossetia a "frozen conflict," but this name implies certain
features besides merely being protracted and unresolved: Frozen conflicts typically
concern claims to a separate territorial and sovereign status.193 Under the Sochi
regime, Georgia retained a background claim of sovereignty but had very limited
rights to exercise that claim and was specifically prohibited from exercising many
of the usual incidents of sovereignty on the defined territory. These features were
no accident: The real driver of the Sochi regime was the underlying internal conflict
between South Ossetia and Georgia. For nearly two decades, the South Ossetian
and Abkhazian regimes have contested the very idea that the Georgian state is
sovereign over them. This does not necessarily mean South Ossetia and Abkhazia
have valid claims; there are arguments on both sides, and I can think of many places
on the planet where secessionists have stronger cases. 194 But it does suggest that
South Ossetia's separatism and self-determination claims, whatever one thinks of
them, are different from the generic, human rights and harm-driven logic of R2P.
South Ossetia's claims are not complaints about abuses of Georgia's sovereignty,
but a challenge to the very idea that Georgia should be sovereign at all.
This difference can be seen most clearly in Russia's recognition of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia right after the war. The claim that Georgia in effect
sacrificed any right to sovereignty over South Ossetia by resorting to violenceRussia's rationale for recognition-is similar to the logic of R2P, which describes
state sovereignty as an obligation (a responsibility to protect) that, if unfulfilled,
opens the door for international intervention to fulfill the obligation. But the
Russian rationale, considered in the abstract, is actually far more expansive, as it
implies not merely a remedial right of intervention to correct an abusive
sovereignty-as happened, say in Libya, and may still happen in Syria-but a right
for an oppressed group to escape the state's sovereignty. Even the most intrusive
193 On the frozen conflicts, see Christopher Borgen, Imagining
Sovereignty, Managing
Secession: The Legal Geography ofEurasia's Frozen Conflicts, 9 OR. REV. INT'L L. 477 (2007)
(discussing the conflicts of Transdniestria, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh); Olga Kamenchuk,
Complexities of Conflict Prevention and Resolution in the Post-Soviet Space: EU-US-Russian Security
Dimensions, 5 EUR. Y.B. MINORITY ISS. 99, 100 (2005-06).
' In Abkhazia, the flight and expulsion of ethnic Georgians in the early 1990s greatly
complicates claims about what the Abkhazian population desires. The current, majority ethnic Abkhaz
population largely favors separation from Georgia, but if the (mostly ethnic Georgian) expellees were
included, the result would be very different. In South Ossetia it is possible to define significant
territories whose pre-1991 majority ethnic Ossetian populations favor separation, but even here
estimates of the existing populations vary considerably. See INT'L CRISIS GRP., SOUTH OSSETIA: THE
BURDEN OF RECOGNITION 2-4, 13-14 (2010), http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/europe/205%
20South%200ssetia%20-%20The%20Burden%20of/o20Recognition.ashx (noting different population
estimates and popular sentiment for either integration with Russia or independence).
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model of R2P does not contemplate changing a state's territory, and the pained
debates over Kosovo's declaration of independence-with even its most ardent
supporters adamantly denying it could have any precedential effect on secessionsuggest how little scope current models have to expand. The Sochi model, if it does
anything, runs right at the problem of conflict over sovereignty and territory.
We shall come, in a moment, to the objections such a model raises; they
are considerable. First, however, we look at one seeming objection that, on
reflection, may actually be a strength: This model is not new. The idea of an
intervening military force with extensive protective authority-which inevitably
would morph into actual governance-starts to sound a lot like an international
transitional administration, or a protectorate, or peacekeeping operations. The
objection, then: Isn't the supposed Sochi model really just the old wine of
peacekeeping and protectorate in a new bottle?
And the response, I think, is: Yes. This is in fact of a piece with such
things-which is to say that Sochi was not an isolated phenomenon, but part of a
trend, a crystallization of various efforts, all in some way responding to the evident
structural inadequacies of the jus ad bellum. 195 The entire effort to develop R2P
arose out of a sense of dissatisfaction with the prevailing standards on
intervention-which is to say, standards on territorial sovereignty. Likewise,
peacekeeping and conflict resolution efforts in Cyprus, Transdniestria, Kosovo and
Bosnia share some of these features. Sochi is simply one more such effort, but a
particularly interesting one precisely because it is different in its underlying
assumptions-and because it was not recognized as part of that trend, but was seen
as something entirely different.
C. Reasonsfor Pessimism:A Mechanism We Do Not Recognize When It Works

So, the Georgian War-though conventionally seen by the United States as
a dangerous throwback to an older model of geopolitics-represents the operation
of a surprisingly sophisticated model that bears deep similarities to, and perhaps
important lessons for improving on, recent, more conventional exercises in
internationalizing internal conflict.
Yet seeing the war in this way is not necessarily a source of optimism. The
Sochi regulatory mechanism has been expressed through two wars and twenty years
of endemic, seemingly irresolvable tension and protracted low-level violence.
Those who are excited about the new interventionism occasionally overlook that
what they are prescribing to regulate internal conflict is international war; recent
experiences, the history of our species, and the reflections of philosophers who have
195 See Brian D. Tittemore, Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying InternationalHumanitarian
Law to United Nations Peace Operations, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 61, 110 (1997) ("Hybrid and
controversial rules appear to be emerging in relation to what have been characterized as
internationalized armed conflicts, such as where one state becomes involved in an internal conflict in
the territory of another state.").
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considered the danger of apologetic justifications for state violence might
recommend against facilely imagining that war solves more problems than it
creates. 196
Still, the use of war as a regulatory device has great pragmatic appeal-at
least, advocates of humanitarian intervention logically must believe it does.197 For
me, pessimism about the value of the Georgian War as a model for effective
intervention norms arises from two different sources in particular: the case-specific
derivation of its norms, and policymakers' evident inability to recognize those
norms when they are actually deployed.
We have seen how the Sochi Agreement's lex specialis governed the
territory of South Ossetia, altering the sovereign rights and obligations of Georgia
and Russia. This regime was effective in internationalizing that internal conflict,
but it was also the product of a specific context; there is no reason to suppose that
what is produced in specific circumstances is readily generalizable. Sochi was an
international agreement, subject to the positivist, voluntaristic norms of treaty
formation. Georgia did not have to enter into the agreement; in this case it did,
producing specific territorial constraints that acted as a regulatory mechanism. But
this is hardly a replicable model: The idea of grounding norms of humanitarian
intervention or conflict regulation on the voluntaristic acquiescence of the very
states whose violent behavior we wish to regulate seems problematically selflimiting.
Moreover, the Sochi regime was not just tailored to a particular conflict, it
was the product of a specific negotiations by the parties to that conflict, and itself an
outcome of the war in the early 1990s. Georgia entered into the Agreement in part
to forestall the risk of further Russian encroachment; 9 Sochi was therefore partly a
product of duressl99 and partly of a Russian imperial strategy, rather than a real
196 Cf Richard Falk, Christian Resurgence and World Order, BROWN J. WORLD AFF., WinterSpring 2006, at 133 ("[M]odern Christian voices are often either silent or apologetic in the wake of
tactics that radically contradict the religiously grounded limitations that just war theory places on the
use of force.. . ."); Amanda Murdie & David R. Davis, Problematic Potential: The Human Rights
Consequences of Peacekeeping Interventions in Civil Wars, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 49 (2010) (discussing
how peacekeeping forces can have both positive and negative effects on human rights in the host
country).
I have argued as much. Timothy Waters, What Now for War Trials After Milosevic?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 16, 2006), http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/031 6 /pO9 sOl-coop.html.
In the article, I stated:
Military force-not threats of prosecution-made our belated interventions in the Balkans
credible.... [W]ar is still the best way to combat war crimes: The energy expended on
tribunals might be better invested in building consensus on robust, timely intervention when
crimes are being committed rather than seeking punishment afterward.
Id.
198 See Omer Kocaman, Russia's Relations with Georgia Within the Context of the Russian
National Interests Towards the South Caucasus in the Post-Soviet Era: 1992-2005, 1 USAK Y.B.
INT'L POL. & L. 347 (2008) (discussing threats by Russian leaders to allow South Ossetia to join Russia
and to bomb Tbilisi; linking Georgia's decision to sign the Sochi Agreement to those threats).
199 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 51-52, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
33 1. Duress is a bar to the formation of treaty under the Vienna Convention, but there is no reason to
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compromise channeling South Ossetian or Georgian interests. 200 Russia was not
interested in a mechanism as an abstract exercise in internationalization; it was
exercising power in the service of its own strategic concerns.201 It was surely
essential to Sochi's success that the protecting party was a great power with a veto
on the Security Council, operating in its own self-defined Near Abroad; it is hard to
imagine a minor power asserting such a right of intervention and acting on it
without other states objecting. The actual contours of the South Ossetian
peacekeeping system, likewise, were not a function of technical calculation but of a
balance-of-forces stand-off. All this makes the Georgian case doctrinally
interesting, but also messy, infected with special interest and particular claims-a
problematic and context-specific system rather than a promising basis for a global
rule on intervention in internal crises.
But the greatest source of pessimism about the possibilities a mechanism
like Sochi has for effectively regulating internal conflicts arises from the rhetorical
reactions with which we began-the critiques leveled against Russia by the United
States and others. For while we accept in principle that war can be a regulatory
mechanism to internationalize internal conflict and we even rationalize the ways
those 'mechanisms' arise out of the grossest assertions of national interest, we still
seem ill-equipped to recognize their operation in practice.
Sochi was about as close as one gets to an internationalized regime for
governing internal conflicts:202 Russian and OSCE involvement were means to
prevent excessive Georgian zeal from terminating an internal dispute. Sochi was a
regime that the United States had accepted, even taken part in, for the better part of
two decades. Yet when the mechanism actually began to operate, U.S. officials
appeared not only unwilling (as they surely were), but genuinely unable to think of
what was happening in those terms. Indeed, almost no one seemed to see the war
for what it plausibly was-an internationalized internal conflict-and instead all
think that the Sochi Agreement would not meet the Convention's standards for validity. Few if any
international agreements have been successfully challenged on those grounds.
200 As we have seen, although Georgia accepted the Sochi regime, it was increasingly dissatisfied
with it, and there is no evidence it ever actually liked it.
201 See Smith, supra note 156, at 125; Allison, supra note 49 (discussing Russia's interests and
strategy in the conflict). Russia was also not principally motivated by sympathy for the separatist
regions but was more concerned with Georgia's independent policy and moves towards NATO. Smith
notes that the South Ossetia issue was not central to Russian policy. Still, despite the problems it
suggests, the self-interest aspect of Sochi might also explain why it is a functional model: All
intervention models rely on states acting with reference to their own interests-there are no pure
interveners-so the fact that here Russia was self-interested merely indicates the circumstances in
which we could expect this model to work.
202 At least, it is one of the better examples. The 1244 regime for Kosovo was considerably more
intensive. And indeed, the much thicker nature of the Kosovo intervention was, for some, a reason to
distinguish between support for recognizing Kosovo's and South Ossetia's independence. See Hanna
Jamar & Mary K. Vigness, Applying Kosovo: Looking to Russia, China, Spain and Beyond After the
InternationalCourt of Justice Opinion on UnilateralDeclarationsof Independence, 11 GERMAN L.J.

913 (2010) (differentiating Kosovo as based on unique circumstances); see also David Wippman,

Kosovo and the Limits ofInternationalLaw, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 129, 129 (2001) (discussing how

"[tihe Kosovo campaign pushed at the boundaries of international law").
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began to debate and criticize the operation of the mechanism as if it were a pure
violation, which the United States labeled aggression. Even though it and other
actors were fully aware of the underlying internal dispute, the United States relied
exclusively on the rules of general international law and the jus ad bellum, which
all but preordained the outcome of its rhetorical exercise, since those rules are
utterly inapplicable to a conflict like South Ossetia.
The inadequacy of that general system for describing and regulating use of
force in certain contexts has occurred to almost everyone: the gaps in application to
terrorists and other non-state actors, for example, and even to imperfectly
internationalized internal conflicts of the kind with which this article is
concerned. 203 Yet in the Georgian War, the inadequacy of those general rules was
actually exacerbated, precisely because the situation appeared to be one in which
the rules would apply-a cross-border tank war between recognized states that
looked like a brief, bloody reversion to classical type, and was called precisely that.
The effect was to distract attention away from the actually existing mechanismthe lex specialis of Sochi and the rules it incorporated, which looked very much like
self-defense norms-and focus it, instead, onto the doctrinally irrelevant general
system.
This does not mean that the United States and its allies were somehow
fooled into adopting the policies they did because of the particular language of the
law on aggression; whatever the limited influence of language and of legal
categories, it does not constrain policymakers in any direct sense. Western powers
had plenty of reasons to support Georgia, just as they found reasons to combine
strong rhetoric with studied inaction once the war broke out. Certainly U.S.
policymakers' statements were consistent with their previously declared political
preferences. There is no evidence, and no reason to suppose, that the United States
took any position it would not otherwise have merely because of linguistic or
doctrinal constraints.
Tams, supra note 12 1; Eyal Benvenisti, Rethinking the Divide Between Jus ad Bellum
and Jus
in Bello in Warfare Against Nonstate Actors, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 541 (2009); Thomas M. Franck,
Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 839 (2001) (discussing the relationship
between terrorism and a jus ad bellum principle); Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International
HumanitarianLaw: Challenges in the "War on Terror", 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55, 57 (2003)
203

(arguing that terrorists do not control territory and cannot engage in armed conflict); Tittemore, supra
note 195 (discussing these matters in relation to U.N. peacekeepers); David S. Weissbrodt, The Role of
International Organizations in the Implementation of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in
Situations of Armed Conflict, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 313, 337-38 (1988) (defining an

"internationalized" armed conflict as one in which "foreign assistance [is] provided to one side or the
other" in an internal armed conflict); see also Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex T 44, U.N. Doc.
S/1994/674 (May 27,1994). That report states:
The character and complexity of the armed conflicts concerned, combined with the web of
agreements on humanitarian law that the parties have concluded among themselves, justifies
the Commission's approach in applying the law applicable in international armed conflicts to
the entirety of the armed conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
Id.
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Yet equally, it would go too far to suppose that, in defining the interests of
the United States, U.S. policymakers were unaffected by the legal environment in
which they operated. Those policymakers acted primarily out of a sense of selfinterest, but their definition of that interest, and of the range of possible or
acceptable means they perceived for vindicating it, is not so simply derived and
cannot simply be assumed.
Certainly it is possible to criticize the resort to violence in internal
conflict-the United States' response to Russia proves that much-but such
criticisms trip over the conceptual problems we have seen here, and are revealed in
the impoverished vocabulary we have to voice them. That alone is problematic
enough, even from a realist perspective, and if one believed (as I do not) that
language actually controls the apparatus of interest-based policymaking, it would be
an almost absolute obstacle to reform of the normative regime. At the very least,
the vocabulary of international law expresses underlying values and assumptions
about how our world is and should be organized, in which case our critique is
properly oriented towards those values and assumptions, which make too much of
the fact of frontiers. The language we use for sovereignty, territory and aggression
204
has not created the gap in our policy, but it does describe it.
We lack useful doctrine to regulate or even discuss the resort of force by a
state within its own territory. We need a jus ad bellum for internal wars, but the
current models, grounded in the classical distinction between an international zone
and a zone of internal sovereignty, are not capable of direct revision. It seems
unlikely that the current approach to intervention, R2P, is moving towards an
effective ad bellum framework either. For all its flaws, Sochi-which places
territory at the center of its process-at least indicates the proper direction.
A respect for the logic underlying the prohibition on aggression (and, for
that matter, democracy and self-determination) might encourage one to ask what
exactly Georgia was doing try to assert its rule and its constitutional order205 over
areas whose present populations do not want to be ruled by it. There may be
excellent answers, but they are hard to find in an international legal order that
renders the questions nearly invisible-that make a mechanism designed to restrain
Georgian overreach look like Russian aggression. It seems that we are constrained
by anachronistic and inflexible categories that do not translate well to actual
pathways that
conflicts, and this forces our efforts to evaluate acts of violence onto
206
distract us from what our critiques should really be engaged with.
That August-but really, in any August-the language and logic of
sovereignty, aggression and territorial integrity shed little light on the dynamics of
internal conflicts; if anything, those legal categories obscure both the nature of
204Thanks to Mark Osiel for prompting this line of thought.
205The very fact that Georgia's partisans have denied purported comments about military
operations being intended to restore the constitutional order (the controversy over Order No. 2, noted
above) suggests their discomfort with claiming such a purpose as a plausible basis for committing
violence against one's own citizens.
206 Thanks to Gabriella Blum for this general idea and phrasing, in a personal communication.
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internal conflicts and our own imperfect efforts to regulate them. Our defective jus
ad bellum produces legal outcomes that merely replicate existing policy preferences
or-more troublingly-channel the choices policymakers make away from
engagement with substantive disputes between political communities and towards
formulaic, enchanted logics.

